RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN ORGANIZERS AND ACTIVISTS
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section I. Introduction 6
Section 2. Methodology 8
Section 3. Recommendations to Increase Impact 10
Section 4. Recommendations to Increase Longevity 21
Section 5. Conclusion 32
Appendix 1. Case Studies 34
Appendix 2. Questionnaire 56
Appendix 3. Interviews Conducted 57
Appendix 4. Acronyms 59
Bibliography 60
Citizen Campaigns: Impact & Longevity in the Digital Era

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose Statement
Social campaigns are crucial aspects of civil society and modern governance that encourage and allow for citizen-driven policy change. However, campaigns often face difficulties regarding their ability to impact policy processes, and their ability to experience longevity past an initial growth phase. Our research is based around identifying how campaigns achieve both impact and longevity. To this end, our team conducted primary and secondary research on 11 citizen-led and digitally empowered social campaigns. While aimed at campaign organizers, the following recommendations also pertain to activists and participants at-large.

HIGH-LEVEL FINDINGS:

1) ACHIEVING IMPACT
Current debates surrounding modern social campaigns focus on what allows digitally-powered campaigns to have an impact. Our research showed that digital tools allow campaigns to mobilize relevant support bases, facilitate direct action, and target this action at key stakeholders. These campaigns are able to achieve greater impact by transitioning large-scale support into large-scale participation.

2) ACHIEVING LONGEVITY
While social campaigns may leverage digital tools to achieve impact, their ability to affect lasting change is often dictated by their ability to achieve longevity. In order to achieve longevity, campaigns must ensure that their selection of goals includes a mix of both short-term and long-term objectives, and must adopt an appropriate organizational structure. This involves deciding to be highly centralized or, when resources are scarce and it doesn't run contrary to the ideological ethos of a campaign's mission, adopting an organizational structure that privileges distributed action.

3) THE TENSION BETWEEN IMPACT AND LONGEVITY
In regards to goal selection and organizational structure, certain campaigns may experience significant tension between the achievement of impact and the achievement of longevity. In these cases, campaign organizers should prioritize either impact or longevity or risk achieving neither.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE IMPACT:

1) Define your goals strategically: Choosing clear and achievable goals for a campaign tends to greater unify and allow supporters to focus their action around one particular set of objectives.

2) Assess likely participation: Measuring interest and support for a specific cause, event, or action before a campaign and throughout its course can guide campaign organizers in terms of resource allocation and strategic direction.

3) Appeal to emotion: Creating compelling, emotional connections between campaigns and participants revealed more invested or dedicated supporters, particularly in the early stages. Campaigns can draw on this emotional investment to achieve greater impact, and should be aware of the ways digital tools can be used to mobilize emotions unlike ever before.

4) Maximize positive public exposure: The way in which a campaign is portrayed in the media and perceived by the general public is key to the perceived legitimacy of the campaign. Campaigns that face negative public perception should actively work with the media and through other means to improve their public image.

5) Relate to your adversary: Campaigns can benefit from an ability to clearly identify and act in relation to their “adversary”. The nature of this interaction between campaign and adversary can be either positive or negative, a choice which is dependent largely on the level of hostility expressed towards the campaign by the adversary.

6) Map networks of influence: Focusing action by coordinating participant support with influence mapping tactics allowed for highly leveraged success. Digital tactics like targeted online petitions or “click-to-call” technology can help to achieve this by allocating resources more effectively and targeting stakeholders who can actually influence change in a given policy area or social setting.

7) Take direct action: Campaigns which look to utilize direct action, attempting to exert power directly over the affairs and situations concerning them, rather than attempting to influence others to make those decisions instead, should leverage digital tools to facilitate mass participation in these efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE LONGEVITY:

1) Build coalitions: Reaching out to actors or institutions within a campaign’s larger social movement was successful in helping campaigns mobilize people and resources, and in enhancing their visibility and legitimacy. Campaigns also benefited from reaching out to, and working with, organizations outside their specific social movement in order to pursue shared goals. As such, campaign organizers should identify organizations with similar guiding ideologies or goals for collaboration.

2) Develop a distributed leadership structure: The manner in which a campaign is organized has a profound effect on virtually all other aspects of a campaign. A key organizational structure that can help campaigns achieve longevity is distributed action, where there are no leaders, but there is a strong foundational support that equally distributes power and responsibility among all participants.

3) Control your message: Given the nature of digital tools in facilitating distributed action and communication, maintaining control of your campaign’s message with centralized and effective coordination is integral for ensuring core goals remain consistent, and are not co-opted or muddled by external actors.

4) Protect participants from physical risks: Physical risks are an ever-present concern for campaign participants, particularly in undemocratic countries or countries with a history of violence against civil society. Campaign organizers should ensure participants are aware of the physical risks associated with participation, and take steps to mitigate physical risks whenever possible.

5) Protect participants from digital risks: Digital surveillance and direct cyber-attacks are a prevalent and increasing risk to social campaigns globally, and heightened awareness and precautions should be taken in all campaign contexts. Human rights campaigns and organizations around the world have documented cases of government infiltration and surveillance on personal computers and mobile phones.

6) Prepare to scale rapidly: In order to capitalize on the rapid growth of a campaign that often results from the amplifying nature of digital tools and social media, campaign organizers should develop proper organizational and digital structures. These structures range from a developing a central website to an “on-ramp” for citizen involvement.
One of the most valuable aspects of any society, regardless of political environment, is the ability of citizens to affect change and impact the decisions of policy makers and other influential entities. The potential for a collective public group to work together to cause policy outcomes or otherwise impactful societal change is one which has been central to many pivotal moments in countries and polities around the world. One need only look at the Ozone Protection campaign, which played a key role in catalyzing the development of an international treaty designed to protect the ozone layer, to realize the positive impact this form of collective action can have.

However, collective action of this nature is also inherently difficult to organize, execute and sustain. Given that many campaigns of this nature develop organically, without the predetermined structure, financing or strategic direction of a business or non-profit organization, it is challenging for many campaigns to get past the point of gathering initial support. These difficulties are unavoidable, but fortunately not insurmountable.

The proliferation of powerful and increasingly accessible digital tools, specifically the Internet, has furthered this dichotomy between potential impact and potential pitfalls for social campaigns. These tools allow campaign organizers to gain attention and support at rates that would have previously been unimaginable. However, these same tools also expose campaigns to challenges and obstacles at a novel scale. The dramatic rise and fall of the Kony 2012 campaign, which attracted massive support in a short-period of time but fell apart quickly and accomplished little, epitomizes the role of the Internet and related tools in helping and hurting social campaigns.

This report was created to answer key questions regarding social campaigns in the digital age. Specifically, the report provides insight and recommendations regarding how contemporary social campaigns can achieve impact and longevity. Our research determined that these two aspects are central to the efficacy and success of any social campaign.

The ability to achieve impact refers to the extent to which a social campaign is able to affect change in its issue area of focus. This impact typically comes through a campaign’s ability to accomplish its goals. According to Dr. Zeynep Tufecki of Harvard University, “Activists, who have made such effective use of technology to rally supporters, still need to figure out how to convert that energy into greater impact.” This paper provides guidance regarding exactly how to convert energy into impact.

The ability to achieve longevity refers to a campaign’s ability to sustain its action and growth in the medium to long-term. Achieving longevity is important as it allows campaigns that have achieved impact to continue to do so, and campaigns which have not achieved impact to sustain themselves and persevere in hopes of achieving future impact.

---

This report brings forth a series of recommendations designed to aid campaigns in increasing both impact and longevity. It is important to note that some of these recommendations, while targeted towards increasing either impact or longevity, will undoubtedly have a bearing on both impact and longevity. This is due to the fact that, in many cases, achieving impact and longevity are complementary goals for campaigns.

However, this report also highlights how, in certain circumstances, a tension arises between achieving impact and achieving longevity, forcing difficult decisions on the part of campaign organizers.

In order to validate these claims, this report draws on case-study analysis and is structured in five parts. First, it provides an overview of the methodology that was used to select and analyze the 11 case studies on which the findings of this report are based. Second, it provides a brief contextual overview of each case study referenced in the report. Third, it provides a series of recommendations related to how campaigns can achieve impact. Fourth, it outlines a similar set of recommendations related to achieving longevity. Finally, it concludes with a set of thoughts related to the potential for tension to arise between the achievement of impact and longevity.

The intended audience for this report is primarily current or aspiring campaign organizers. That being said, the recommendations contained in this report are relevant to campaign supporters, concerned citizens, activists-at-large, and other individuals or organizations hoping to understand and engage with social campaigns and social issues.
SECTION 2:
Methodology

This project has two main aims. Firstly, it seeks to determine what motivates citizens to act and to participate in social campaigns. Secondly, it hopes to uncover what factors encourage the continued participation of these citizens. As a result, it is concerned with discovering the factors that allow social campaigns to achieve both impact and, most importantly, longevity. The use of the word “campaign” is deliberate and should not be confused with the term “movement.” By campaign, this paper refers to organized courses of action meant to achieve something finite. They can be recognized to have succeeded or to have failed. Movements by contrast, are too large and nebulous to fit the definition of a campaign, even though they are also generally comprised of people with similar intentions and shared ideals. A campaign may belong to a movement, but a movement cannot be constrained to a single campaign. For instance, the Internet Ungovernance Forum held in Istanbul in 2014 was a specific campaign that wanted to shift the political and corporate influence in Internet governance towards civil society, but was just one aspect of a wider Turkish Internet freedom movement.

In order to best answer these questions, the case study method has been selected as the foundation for this project’s research design. Given the large number of social campaigns that could be studied, our selection of the final list of cases was governed by three principle criteria. Each campaign (i) has a substantial international component or was maintained by a diaspora community, (ii) has utilized digital tools in an effort to achieve its goals, and (iii) has been led by citizens and/or by civil society organizations. As a result, this methodology explicitly excludes the inclusion of campaigns that were led by political groups. For instance, Barack Obama’s election campaign in 2008 or Italy’s Five Star Movement were not deemed acceptable for study, despite their notable use of digital tools. Given that the goals and intentions of political campaigns are often significantly different from those of citizen and civil society-led social campaigns, it would not be useful to compare the two for this particular study. By comparing campaigns that successfully align with the given criteria, the findings will be comparable and more robust.

Efforts were also made to ensure that the case studies selected span geographical regions, thematic issue areas, and digital tactics employed. This group also made a deliberate effort to shy away from selecting campaigns that utilized only hashtags such as #BringBackOurGirls or #JeSuisCharlie.

It should also be noted that these campaigns experienced ranging levels of success, in whole or in part. Any evaluation of success was based primarily on the thoughts of the individuals who participated in each campaign, and not on any metric devised by this project’s authors. While successful campaigns often offer invaluable lessons for both achieving impact and longevity, in many instances, the more important and unique findings can be derived from those campaigns that were not successful. These selection criteria ensure that we have controlled for case selection bias. Additionally, because this methodology utilizes cross-case examination techniques, it will have also controlled for concerns of external validity.

While this paper is a synthesis of available campaign-distributed literature, data analytics when available, and media reports, it is also based substantially on first-person interviews conducted with individuals who were involved in a significant manner in each campaign. At least three individuals were interviewed for each campaign in order to obtain the necessary data and firsthand accounts, a feature that it is expected to make this analysis particularly strong. Prior to commencing any interviews, this group determined what evidence to gather and compiled a questionnaire, as seen in appendix 2. This use of multiple sources and techniques in the data gathering process will help control for internal validity as well.
Case Studies

- Avaaz’s “Break the Blackout” campaign in Syria
- Change.org Chinese Labour Standards Campaigns
- Global Dialogue on the Future of Iran
- I Paid A Bribe
- Idle No More
- Movimiento 15
- Occupy Central with Love and Peace/The Umbrella Movement
- People’s Climate March
- SOPA/PIPA Protest Campaign
- Turkish Internet Ungovernance Forum
- We Are All Khaled Said
Goal selection is an absolutely critical aspect of a social campaign's ability to create both impact and achieve longevity. In campaigns that lack a leader, a clear goal can often fill the void that a great leader would bring. The goals of the campaigns studied for the purposes of this project were diverse. Some sought to simply gather people for a march, while others had the explicit aim of removing a piece of legislation from the legislative process. Others focused on tackling larger issues such as a political reform for universal suffrage. The size of a goal has great power over a social campaign's ability to achieve impact; however, as this research suggests, it is often at odds with a campaign's ability to achieve longevity.

The campaigns that selected smaller and more event-specific or time-sensitive goals generally had an easier time achieving impact. For instance, the SOPA/PIPA demonstrators united with the goal of fighting the passage of two specific pieces of legislation, and were successful in doing so. A contrast to the SOPA/PIPA method of goal selection is presented by the Idle No More campaign. While Idle No More was initially concerned with stopping Bill C-45, its campaign organizers did not prioritize this goal over their other more vague goals, and were accordingly unable to stop the passage of that legislation. Similar to SOPA/PIPA, even though the People's Climate March was concerned with climate change more generally, its specific goal was not to bring about an end to all man-made processes that are destroying the environment, but simply to mobilize people for what they hoped would be the largest march in history. The Internet Ungovernance Forum was also preoccupied with an event-specific goal with its aim to hold a conference at the same time as the UN's Internet Governance Forum.

These campaigns may have been preoccupied with larger issues; however, their goals were smaller, more focused, event-specific, and time-sensitive, and thus had a greater immediate impact. Organizers of social campaigns should recognize and capitalize upon these opportunities when possible. This does not mean that campaigns should shy away from adopting larger goals but at the least need to be cognizant of the drawbacks of this approach for the achievement of immediate impact. The 15M campaign, for instance, sought to reform what its participants believed to be a faulty political and economic system that was to blame for the social ills of anti-austerity measures. It was only able to truly make any progress when it tackled these broader goals at the micro level, focusing on housing evictions in small neighbourhoods, as opposed to reforming policy at the macro level. A campaign that seeks the broad reform of the financial system is unlikely to achieve impact as quickly or as effectively as a campaign that focuses its efforts on a smaller goal.

What the 15M and Peoples Climate March campaigns also highlight is an important tension in respect to goal selection. While campaigns that focus on smaller and more time-specific goals are more likely to have an immediate impact, it is equally true that these campaigns find it difficult to achieve longevity. For instance, the SOPA/PIPA protests were incredibly successful and managed to achieve their initial goal; however, they have not been able to truly capitalize on that success since then in order to effectuate change in other related Internet freedom struggles. Similarly, those who organized for the People's Climate March have not been organizing in that way as successfully for other climate justice issues. When campaigns achieve great impact but are unable to ride
that momentum going forward it can have a disparaging and destabilizing effect. This is a key tension within goal selection that campaign organizers should consider. In order to mitigate this strain, campaigns should consider a mix of both short-term and long-term goals. In this way, they will be able to build on initial successes and not dissolve, as is often unfortunately the case with initially successful social campaigns.

SECTION 3.02: ASSESS LIKELY PARTICIPATION

Measuring interest and support for a specific cause, event, or action before a campaign and throughout its course can guide campaign organizers in terms of resource allocation and strategic direction.

Measuring interest and support for a specific cause, event, or action throughout the course of a campaign has proved to be valuable as campaign organizers are better able to efficiently allocate scarce resources and realize when and where important decisions and events are best suited. Within the campaign selection process, online platforms, such as Avaaz and Change.org, gauge interest in campaigns before sponsoring or pursuing a specific cause. This is a rigorous process for Avaaz during its campaigns. Once a potential campaign or cause is proposed, a tester email is sent out to 100,000 members where 10% of members must open the email. Once opened, 40% of individuals must click through the content of the email and the Avaaz website. If more than 80% subsequently sign the petition or donate to the cause, the campaign is accepted and disseminated to the wider membership. In other words, Avaaz rolls out campaigns that have mobilized around 6% of the general audience. This tactic proved advantageous in Avaaz’s campaign in Syria as it allowed Avaaz to know that they would be able to raise enough money to reach objectives prior to investing resources.1

Change.org engages in similar tactics through email testing. Change.org has access to a large database of email subscribers, which allows them to make use of extensive email testing techniques and utilize their findings to drive impact. Testing helps the organization remove biases, develop better results, and grow professionally.2 They send out emails in many batches, using control and test versions, and ensure results on items such as click-throughs, open rates, and the signing of petitions are significant. As online platforms such as Change.org and Avaaz gauge interest in a campaign, many note that campaign selection is consequently a “mix of intuition and playing by the numbers.”3

While Avaaz and Change.org’s ability to select the campaigns they wish to pursue is central to their strategy to gauge interest, other campaigns in our analysis also measured interest and support for events and actions. For instance, the WAKS and OCLP campaigns gauged interest, albeit on a much smaller and personal scale. In the WAKS campaign, the Facebook page administrators used methods such as online polls based on suggestions and ideas from the community through requested feedback on issues.4 Moreover, In the GDFI campaign, both ASI19 and Psiphon had relevant online data and information pertaining to what relative number of Iranians they expected to engage with.5 The GDFI then employed surveys, polls, and comment aggregation from forums and Twitter that the campaign used to determine a variety of important stakeholder information, such as interests and ages, as well as topic preferences for panel and event discussion.6

---

3 Interview with Sarah Ryan, a Campaign Strategist and Coordinator with Change.org (March 6, 2015)
4 Interview with Adel Iskandar, Ph. D., Associate Professor at Simon Fraser University, Department of Communications (March 10, 2015)
5 Interview with Karl Kathuria, CEO of Psiphon, Inc. (March 11, 2015).
6 Interview with Sean Willet, Chief Communications Officer, The Munk School of Global Affairs. (March 11, 2015).
Some of the more successful or stable campaigns that we researched used this tactic of community deliberation and feedback as the foundation for movements. Organizers of SOPA/PIPA gauged interest by sourcing information from online forums, particularly Reddit. On these forums, people discussed what they disliked about the bills and formulated hypothetical tactics to protest the legislation. These online discussions helped to inform the way that Fight for the Future led their campaign efforts, by providing a point of reference regarding which issues were of particular importance to those who opposed SOPA/PIPA. Similarly, OCLP gauged interest both within the wider pro-democracy movement and wider public through an exhaustive 20-month deliberation process. OCLP founder Benny Tai Yiu-ting estimates the 3 leaders combined held over 1,000 meetings with stakeholders throughout Hong Kong. The 10-day civil referendum implemented in June 2014 by OCLP was the next step in gauging interest for the type of electoral reform that was desired by the general public and had a turnout of 792,808 people, or roughly 10% of the population. This more than doubled Tai’s optimistic estimate of 300,000 people.

These cases demonstrate the value of gauging interest in a campaign, event, and action. While organizers may not have the ability to gauge interest on a specific cause, such as the case with Change.org and Avaaz, organizers can assess interest and support for various aspects of a campaign in order to ensure scarce resources are used as efficiently as possible.

For centuries, appealing to emotion has been a principle component of mobilizing individuals to participate in social campaigns, effective not only for propelling people into action, but also for maintaining a campaign’s momentum. Emotional mobilization can occur naturally or can be highly structured and deliberate, especially given the ability for digital tools to structure emotions. A cleverly crafted hashtag on Twitter for instance, can set the emotional tone of a physical protest. Emotions, however, can be fleeting so while it is important for social campaigns to involve strong emotional appeals, campaigns may find it difficult to achieve longevity or impact if they base their entire efforts on them.

Many of the individuals interviewed for the purposes of this project cited a specific image, idea, or moment when they felt compelled to act and take part in a campaign. For instance, Javier Toret – a member of the 15M Data Analytics group – notes, “The [Eurozone] crisis is a necessary condition, but it alone was not sufficient to trigger what happened and what was expressed in 2011 [...] Movements need an emotional spark, an impulse, a trigger.” Countries like Italy, Greece and Ireland that are not culturally dissimilar to Spain and that experienced the same political and economic ills as a result of anti-austerity measures, did not witness protests as large as

7 Interview with Holmes Wilson, Co-Founder of Fight for the Future (February 22, 2015).
8 Interview with Benny Tai Yiu-ting, OCLP Founder (March 11, 2015).
9 Ibid
15M and intentional focus on emotion is one reason for this. In the case of We Are All Khaled Said (WAKS), it was the photograph of Khaled Said’s dead and beaten face that galvanized people into action and that inspired the creation of the Arabic WAKS Facebook page. On the Facebook page, this image was posted and juxtaposed with an earlier photo of a healthy Khaled, and when asked what imagery caused people to act, journalist and scholar Ahmed Kahdry replied, “More than anything else, it was Khaled Said’s picture; not just his murdered body, but the comparison before his murder reminded you why he wasn’t around anymore.” This image “transformed Said into a focal point for the nation; inspired by him, citizens rallied together for said as he was the human face of Egypt’s tragedy, and the galvanizer of its digital youth.” Capitalizing on an emotional spark or trigger is key to the ability of any social campaign to exert impact.

While some appeals to emotion are unplanned and occur organically, social campaigns would do well to consider the manner in which emotional appeals can be constructed deliberately. For instance, Change.org uses professional storytellers for their campaigns to craft stories that will inspire regular citizens sign an online petition or participate in a campaign. Similarly, Avaaz’s Syria campaign utilized email blasts of a YouTube video featuring a citizen journalist in Syria telling his story and asking for help to end the atrocities. This tactic proved successful, as Avaaz was able to raise $1.5 million for supplies for citizen journalists. These purposeful and highly crafted emotional appeals play an integral role in propelling citizens to support campaigns.

Social campaigns should also be cognizant of the benefits of evoking certain or specific emotions amongst participants. In a number of the campaigns studied, indignation or anger served as one of the key emotions that motivated citizens to participate in a campaign. Throughout the initial protests and eventual Arab Spring, the WAKS Facebook page became a forum where people posted other accounts of police brutality and shared images that created a swelling of anger. In the 15M case as well, sentiment analysis of Tweets related to the campaign illustrate that the time period that saw the greatest emotional charge on Twitter coincided with the stages of the protests during which protestors used their mobile phone cameras to capture police violence against non-violent protestors. They streamed these videos online in real time on websites such as sol.tv and posted photos to Facebook, Twitter, and a 15M-specific Flickr account. This galvanized the Spanish public in favor of the protestors, and the number of individuals gathered in Spain’s plazas increased exponentially from that point onward. These images and videos intensified the feelings of indignation that had been percolating among the Spanish people, creating a sense of collective solidarity among disparate networks of people and mobilizing them into action. Indignation can be inspired unintentionally as well, with multiple people involved in the GDFI claiming that it was actually the Iranian government’s actions of publically condemning and censoring access to the campaign domestically that appealed the most emotionally to Iranian citizens and drove them to access the campaign through Psiphon in greater numbers.

Empowerment is also an important emotion to mobilize for citizen involvement in social campaigns. The appeal of some campaigns was that they offered a more attractive alternative to the current environments, and that citizens felt they had a real opportunity to bring about that alternative. Occupy Central presented an alternate method of comprehensive deliberation rather than the centralized and Beijing-influenced form of current electoral politics. Tai’s initial manifesto calls for moderate participants that “should include social opinion

12 Interview with Ahmed Kadry, scholar and writer (February 20, 2015).
17 Ibid
leaders, especially those who have never broken the law, or non-radical political leaders, former officials ... and academics.”

I Paid a Bribe smartly appeals to the emotional desire of individuals wanting to make a tangible difference in their community, through the positive presentation of corruption reporting metrics and tools. Furthermore, their advocacy campaigns are charged with optimism and their professionally produced music video strongly advocates a message of self-empowerment. These examples show support for participatory system creation when they are not already in place and appeal to people by offering them an alternative.

The use of humour is also an integral emotion that featured in a number of campaigns. Professor Sahar Khamis, who has authored numerous books on digital tools and the Egyptian Revolution, notes, “The role of humour was a tool of activism. The Egyptian people were so creative and talented in using jokes, sarcasm, art, and culture. Humour was breaking the fear of the dictator.” She notes a young man who, during the revolution, held a sign that read, “Please go, my hand is hurting,” from holding up the sign. Additionally, with the 15M demonstrations, happiness and humour are also frequently cited as important in interviews with participants of the movement. The Indignados facilitated happiness through the use of humor. Placards displayed slogans that subverted popular culture such as “We are not anti-system, the system is anti-us” or “Dear crisis, it’s not you – it’s me.” Other signs in the encampments displayed Google searches for “Spanish democracy” turning up “Spanish democracy not found.” Online, a group of demonstrators started a Twitter parody account called @acampadapolicia, which tweeted as if police officers had been the ones occupying the squares. Again, this helped to build community and solidarity; however, interview subjects noted that this type of humor was important for diffusing tense and stressful situations. Moreover, “It was great to be able to laugh during the occupations because it made staying in the square for a prolonged period of time not feel like an obligation,” explained one protestor. In this way, happiness lowered the cost of participation and was partially responsible for the longevity of the movement.

Campaigns that fail to mobilize emotions are likely to have little impact. While this is not a novel development, those looking to organize social campaigns should be aware of the growing opportunities for emotional mobilization presented by the digital tools and tactics listed above.

SECTION 3.04: MAXIMIZE POSITIVE PUBLIC EXPOSURE

The way in which a campaign is portrayed in the media and perceived by the general public is key to the perceived legitimacy of the campaign. Campaigns that face negative public perception should actively work with the media and through other means to improve their public image.

Campaigns can maximize positive public exposure in two main ways. First, is the way campaigns interact with and are portrayed in traditional media. Second, is the level of awareness and type of sentiment that the public-at-large, meaning those who do not directly support or oppose the campaign, carry towards the campaign. A campaign’s public exposure related to media interfacing and public relations can generally be categorized as either proactive or reactive in nature.

Proactive engagement related to the media and public relations is used by campaigns as a strategy to raise awareness and improve public sentiment regarding the campaign. While this is not a necessary strategy for campaigns to employ, it can have large upside if executed properly. This type of proactive engagement is particularly effective if campaigns are able to access and engage with prominent public figures that may support the campaign or simply interact with the campaign in a public setting.

19 Interview with Sahar Khamis, Ph. D., author of Islam Dot Com and Egyptian Revolution 2.0 and Associate Professor at the University of Maryland (March 10, 2015)
20 Ibid
21 Interview with an anonymous 15M participant (March 26, 2015).
The PCM experienced significant success in raising public awareness of its actions due to the public support it received from notable international figures such as UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, actor Leonardo Di Caprio, and US President Barack Obama. For instance, Obama was highlighted as the most influential contributor to the campaign on Twitter through sharing tweets on the PCM with his 47 million followers. Receiving public support from such influential figures is not a replicable feat for the vast majority of campaigns. However, PCM’s particular strength lay in its ability to shift this public awareness focused on the actions of celebrities towards the actions of the campaign as a whole. In this sense, campaigns should not only be able to identify any publically notable support for their campaign, but also engage with these supportive figures or entities and shift focus away from the individual and towards the campaign as a whole.

A proactive tactic campaigns can employ regarding the traditional media involves partnering or collaborating with media outlets on points of common interest. This can occur when a media outlet either covers a campaign or issues that overlap with those a campaign is attempting to address. The outcome of such collaboration can be to raise the public profile of the campaign, or the issue it is focused upon. OCLP partnered with the Hong Kong Economic Journal to release its first public statement and manifesto and was done deliberately to engage with the middle-class and intellectual audience of the journal. Campaign founder Tai knew this was an important demographic to convince of his efficacy before focusing on already inspired audiences.

I Paid a Bribe, PCM and Change.org have all collaborated with traditional media to further their public exposure in some way. PCM reached out to large traditional media outlets such as the New York Times, The Guardian, and Rolling Stone to not only reiterate their message, but to also disseminate important logistical information. I Paid a Bribe engages with the Indian press for assistance in assessing the level of corruption in Indian governmental departments, and to notify the press of specific bribery cases. In this case, engagement with the media helps I Paid a Bribe to achieve its goals by increasing the public pressure on offending officials or officers. Finally, Change.org also works with media contacts to actively spread stories related to the development and success of their campaigns.

These proactive, forward-thinking approaches employed by some campaigns stand in contrast to the reactive approach to media interfacing and public relations used by others. In these cases, campaigns recognized a weakness related to their level of public exposure, or to the way in which the public perceives their campaign, and subsequently reacts to this deficiency. Recognizing such weaknesses can often be crucial for campaigns, as an acute lack of public awareness or a negative public perception can challenge the overall legitimacy of the campaign. It is also important to note that poor public relations can be the result of a failure to establish a public presence, or a concerted effort on the part of adversaries to degrade the public perception of a given campaign. In either circumstance, it is necessary for organizers to respond via strategic public relations and media interfacing activity.

These proactive, forward-thinking approaches employed by some campaigns stand in contrast to the reactive approach to media interfacing and public relations used by others. In these cases, campaigns recognized a weakness related to their level of public exposure, or to the way in which the public perceives their campaign, and subsequently reacts to this deficiency. Recognizing such weaknesses can often be crucial for campaigns, as an acute lack of public awareness or a negative public perception can challenge the overall legitimacy of the campaign. It is also important to note that poor public relations can be the result of a failure to establish a public presence, or a concerted effort on the part of adversaries to degrade the public perception of a given campaign. In either circumstance, it is necessary for organizers to respond via strategic public relations and media interfacing activity.

---


24 Interview with Venkatesh Kannaiah, Content Head - Janaonline, (March 1, 2015).

25 Interview with Sarah Ryan, Campaign Strategist and Coordinator with Change.org (March 6, 2015).
According to Jonathan Nelson, an organizer of SOPA/PIPA offline protests in San Francisco, the anti-SOPA/PIPA campaign, while successful in many regards, suffered from a public relations problem. As a campaign that had developed almost exclusively online, there was no human face or public image to match to the SOPA/PIPA protestors. In the view of Mr. Nelson, this made it difficult for the general public to connect to the anti-SOPA/PIPA campaign. As a reaction to this public relations weakness, Mr. Nelson, and other technology community leaders around the USA, organized physical protests to put a public face to the SOPA/PIPA protests, with the end goal of restoring any legitimacy that had been eroded due to this previously opaque public image.

The need to react to negative public perception was also evident in the case of the OCLP once it transitioned to the Umbrella Movement and began its occupation. This forthrightness was unusual culturally and its public image was the victim of delegitimizing attacks from its adversary, such as an article from China's People Daily newspaper which claimed the USA was “manipulating” the campaign. In response to this external pressure, the organizers of Occupy Central sought to improve public perception by ensuring their narrative was featured in the international media and publications framed around human rights or governance issues. This was partially done through a group called “Translating the Umbrella Movement” which was comprised of volunteers fixers and translators for foreign media operating in Hong Kong. This focus on smaller regional international news organizations without their own translators allowed the founders of Translating the Umbrella Movement to spread the message of OCLP and the Umbrella Movement to a wider audience.

All movements and campaigns have goals, whether defined or broad. Such goals seek societal, political, institutional, environmental, or cultural change. For some, the goals acknowledge a force, actor, or institution that directly or indirectly create grievances leading to a campaign’s mobilization. For convenience, these grievance makers can be roughly lumped together as a campaign’s “adversary”. For certain campaigns, success (or successful action) relies in part to a strategic consideration with the adversary. More than that, the accurate identification of a campaign’s adversary is important for ensuring actions and messaging lines up with originally stated goals.

Identifying an adversary is a difficult task made even more challenging when a campaign has low levels of message control. The We Are All Khaled Said campaign exemplifies this, as the lack of applied social media moderation confused discussions of “who they were fighting for, and who they were fighting against”. Initially, the adversary was identified as police forces guilty of brutality, but then it transitioned to being the Mubarak regime. This transition is a product of other factors, illustrating the changing goals and purposes of a campaign.

Moving beyond identification, a campaign may choose to work positively with the adversary. This proactive approach requires certain conditions, including a politically open

---

27 Interview with Sahar Khamis, Ph. D., author of Islam Dot Com and Egyptian Revolution 2.0 and Associate Professor at the University of Maryland (March 10, 2015)
28 Ibid
29 Interview with an anonymous 15M participant (March 26, 2015).
environment and an adversary that is not hostile towards campaign participants. For Change.org, campaigns involving businesses (but not governments) often take the approach that they want to “work with the other side,” utilizing petitions to work with the company for positive change. An example is their Apple campaign, which actually used the company’s own brand identity (“think differently”) to create a rapport with them, instead of being automatically on the offence. Change.org also use a Decision Maker Tool to create a direct link between decision makers and petitioners, avoiding the “us versus them” mentality.

The OCLP campaign illustrates the difficult nature of dealing with a governmental adversary. Tai Yiu-ting was sure to respond to government criticism regarding his campaign and his public writing and elaboration on the legalities of civil disobedience came in response to his critics within the Hong Kong government. The student leaders were actually invited to directly converse with government officials and accepted, however they were quick to publicize that the talks were not fruitful due to the governments unwillingness to change. The opposition from the Chinese government was also significant, which included revoking the right of mainland travel to even crowd-level protestors identified as participants, as well as censorship. On September 28th, the Peoples Republic of China issued the following censorship orders: “All websites must immediately clear away information about Hong Kong students violently assaulting the government and about ‘Occupy Central.” The adversaries in this campaign were significant forces, but OCLP’s intentional management of this relationship maintained a balance of power.

Such strong opposition still requires certain relationship management tactics. But rather than dealing directly with the adversary, campaigns can also be strategic with how their internal tactics influence the opposition. The Global Dialogue on the Future of Iran showcases this need. Since the Iranian government could be identified as hostile to the campaign, organizers were forced to be selective about what traffic in information and analytics the campaign was willing to release, as it could potentially be used by the Iranian government nefariously against participants.

Some campaigns dealt with hostile oppositions by pivoting their relationship with other adversarial opponents. For the Turkish pro-internet freedom campaign, activists were initially extremely hostile towards the United Nations and the Internet Governance Forum. Leading activists publically boycotted the 2014 IGF due to the Turkish government’s regressive Internet policies, creating the IUF as a ‘counter-event’ to the IGF. However, despite the opposition, the IUF (and the Turkish pro-internet freedom campaign) benefited from the IGF event. The IUF effectively ‘piggy-backed’ the IGF’s global spotlight, speakers and 2000+ foreign attendees, garnering more support than if the IGF had not been held. Instead of continued unabashed opposition, organizers of the IUF worked within the IGF to garner such support. While some IUF organizers continued their disapproval with the IGF, others reevaluated their identification of the United Nations as adversary, and instead utilized the institution as a means of targeting the original adversary: regressive Turkish policies.

SECTION 3.06: MAP NETWORKS OF INFLUENCE

Focusing action by coordinating participant support with influence mapping tactics allowed for highly leveraged success. Digital tactics like targeted online petitions or “click-to-call” technology can help to achieve this by allocating resources more effectively and targeting stakeholders who can actually achieve change.

An invaluable strategy for generating impact is influence mapping and transitions from gauging interest to directing that interest to key areas. This involves understanding the weight of a stakeholder’s overall influence in a particular area, the relationships between stakeholders, and the

---

30 Interview with Sarah Ryan, Campaign Strategist and Coordinator with Change.org (March 6, 2015).
32 Interview with Sean Willent, Director of Communications for The Munk School of Global Affairs (March 10, 2015).
33 Interview with Nate Schenkkan, Eurasia Program Officer for Freedom House 20 February 2015).
decision-making processes in general. Once campaigns are aware of these things, they can make better-informed decisions about who to target in order to effectuate change. Campaigns that were able to bridge influence mapping tactics with the coordination of their activities were highly effective, as they successfully leveraged participant support for strategic focus points.

For instance, according to Fight for the Future founder Holmes Wilson, one of the most effective tactics used by his organization involved identifying the key influencers and decision-makers related to SOPA/PIPA – primarily Senate representatives – and utilizing “click-to-call technology,” which allowed individuals to call their representative by simply clicking on a button on the computer. Additionally, during the Turkish pro-Internet freedom campaign, organizers of the IUF targeted IGF attendees through on-site materials, strategic secondary hashtags such as #ungovforum and convenient inter-event shuttle busses. With respect to the 15M movement, some of the Indignados created an online petitioning tool called oiga.me – literally “listen to me” – that still exists today. The tool allows users to register a petition online for virtual signatures. The target of the petition, most often the Member of Parliament or Senator with the power to create change in that area, would then be emailed or faxed the petition. The tool also allowed for the creator of the petition to receive a hard copy that could be delivered to the target in person. This targeting distinguished oiga.me from petition platforms such as Change.org. Sometimes, the organizer could also indicate a hashtag representative of that particular petition for widespread dissemination on Twitter. Figure 1 shows an archived campaign urging Spain’s Popular Party to vote in favour of a legislative initiative against housing evictions.

Influence mapping is a vital tool for understanding the stakeholder power and influence that may have a pivotal impact on a campaign’s success or failure. It allows social campaigns to adopt more targeted and often efficient campaigns. The identification of stakeholders and the mapping of the power and influence that they exert over a particular situation are critical for both gaining the support and the resources needed to reach a particular goal.

**SECTION 3.07: TAKE DIRECT ACTION**

Campaigns which look to utilize direct action, attempting to exert power directly over the affairs and situations concerning them, should leverage digital tools to facilitate mass participation in these efforts.

The campaigns researched have utilized a combination of both indirect and direct action, with various levels of success. Campaigns such as Change.org’s Chinese labour standards campaign are premised, for the most part, entirely on indirect actions such as lobbying through the use of petitions. Other campaigns look to utilize direct action, attempting to exert power directly over the affairs and situations concerning them, rather than attempting to influence others to make those decisions. While direct action such as marches and protests have existed as the most frequently used methods of direct action, it is essential to understand the manner in which the digital revolution has provided campaigns greater opportunity for more targeted and successful direct action.

---

34 Interview with Holmes Wilson, Co-Founder of Fight for the Future (February 22, 2015).
For centuries, sit-ins, demonstrations, blockades, marches, and protests have existed as the most frequently utilized methods of action by social campaigns. While effective in demonstrating immediate impact and, in certain cases, galvanizing public and media attention, there are a number of considerations for campaign organizers. For instance, when the Idle No More campaign utilized blockades, this often garnered the campaign negative attention. When a very small group of 15M participants heckled and threw objects at politicians in Barcelona, this too gained the campaign negative attention in the press, despite how serious a commitment to non-violence the campaign had made as a whole. As the section on Logistical Organization will illustrate, there are a number of additional complications that may need to be mitigated whenever large numbers of people are expected to gather in a particular area.

I Paid A Bribe is a clear example of the possibility for direct action that digital tools provide to social campaigns. The corruption-tracking platform (Figure 2) is their principle tool for direct action, allowing citizens to report bribe requests or honest offers through the I Paid a Bribe webpage, the mobile app, or the telephone. Citizens can make requests anonymously or specifically indicate the name of the offending officer. Once targeted reports are vetted, I Paid a Bribe works with local government agencies and the press to follow through on certain cases. The very act of denouncing an officer and reporting a bribe is a method of direct action that has been facilitated by the digital revolution.

The SOPA/PIPA campaign has also been able to leverage digital tools for effective action. For instance, the campaign coordinated a 24 hour website blackout on January 18, 2012. This tactic involved websites blacking out their entire website or some portions of their content. Instead of the regular site or content, visitors were directed to information pages that explained the negative aspects of SOPA/PIPA. According to Fight for the Future, approximately 115,000 sites participated in the blackouts. On Wikipedia alone, one of the major sites to participate in the blackouts, the SOPA/PIPA information page was accessed 162 million times in the 24-hour period of the blackouts. The other key direct action tactic utilized by the campaign was “click-to-call” technology, which allowed concerned citizens to contact their elected political representatives. Those sites that participated in the January 18 online protests directed visitors to call the constituency office of the congressman or senator in their district. Unlike a petition with signatures not targeted to anyone in particular, this tactic allowed people to directly contact people who had the power to effectuate the desired change.

In Spain, the Indignados leveraged digital technology and offline direct action tactics quite successfully once the movement had decentralized further and moved into the neighbourhoods. An already existing civil society group known as the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (Platform for People Affected by Mortgages) (Figure 3) was strengthened significantly both by the initial 15M occupations and its further decentralization. It worked in tandem with the neighbourhood assemblies to come to the defence of those at risk of being evicted from their homes as a result of the housing bubble created by the 2008 financial crisis. Individuals were encouraged to register the date and time they were

---

37 Ibid.
supposed to be evicted online with the PAH or on social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook. Members of the neighbourhood assembly and the PAH would physically stand in front the house, blocking the entrance from the authorities who were to carry out the evictions. Since its inception in 2010, the PAH’s Stop Desahucios campaign has managed to stop 1135 evictions.38 This is an excellent example of citizens taking matters into their own hands in an issue area – housing – that was arguably one of the largest of the 15M movement.

While the methods of effective action available to social campaigns will vary according to the campaign and its goals, social campaigns need to be aware of the real potential for digital mass direct action in addition to physical act in order to effectuate change. As participants begin to see the very real power they have for achieving change themselves without waiting for a politician, CEO, or judge to do so for them, they will be encouraged and empowered to continue participation. Over time, these non-traditional and targeted acts of civil disobedience can contribute to the longevity of a social campaign.

Figure 3

A number of the social campaigns studied were structured as formal or informal coalitions, which played a significant role in their ability to attain longevity. The benefits of forming coalitions are manifold. Often, collaborating with other advocates and groups who have similar goals can be extremely helpful for building strength in numbers, mobilizing resources, and enhancing legitimacy. The presence of numerous groups working together for a common purpose can heighten visibility and ensure that a coalition appears more reliable. This in turn can make it more appealing to potential allies and more powerful in the eyes of adversaries.

Building coalitions allows campaigns to mobilize more citizens. SOPA/PIPA organizers for instance, drew on pre-existing offline social networks to gain traction and reach a greater audience. Specifically, the organizers of Fight for the Future reached out to their friends who worked in the technology industry in order to mobilize the support base of various technology companies.\(^1\) This was particularly important given that the SOPA/PIPA legislation was being expedited through the United States’ legislative process. A similar practice occurred with the People’s Climate March. Involving 1,574 organizations, the PCM relied heavily on forming coalitions. Within the march in New York for example, the PCM involved all parties interested in climate justice ranging from 1 Million Women to Manhattan Young Democrats. As 20% of participants came to the march with an organization, this process of coalition building proved to be advantageous.\(^2\) Having over 1,000 groups involved in rallying around a single issue increased both the PCM’s visibility and its legitimacy.

Additionally, some of the social campaigns analyzed heightened the increased access to resources that coalitions can bring. The Internet Ungovernance Forum for instance, earned support such as funding and organizational capacity from other groups belonging to the broader pro-democracy movement in Turkey, as well as from the global network of pro-Internet freedom organizations. In the case of Idle No More, by 2013, the campaign’s founders recognized their need for assistance in growing the movement in a sustainable manner. According to Clayton Thomas-Muller, an experienced Indigenous rights activist and former Idle No More campaigner, Idle No More formed a strategic partnership with Defenders of the Land, an established Canadian Indigenous rights group.\(^3\) Moreover, the Global Dialogue in Iran also reached out to other organizations within the movement. ASL19 formed a coalition with Psiphon, which provides user support and circumvention tools, as well as the Iranian diaspora. Therefore, working within a coalition can also provide opportunities for individuals and organizers to pool resources, allowing coalition members to maximize their effectiveness.

Naturally, working in coalitions is not without its challenges. These may include lack of familiarity with the processes of group decision-making or disagreement with the coalition’s position. Some groups may have to compromise certain portions of their mandates or mission statements in order to fully participate in a campaign. If groups looking to form coalitions are uncomfortable with making these concessions, then the coalition may lose its ability to be effective and the campaign may struggle to achieve longevity.

---

\(^1\) Interview with Holmes Wilson, Co-Founder of Fight for the Future (March 5, 2015).


\(^3\) Interview with Clayton Thomas-Muller, Organizer for Defenders of the Land (February 26, 2015).
SECTION 4.02: PRACTICE DISTRIBUTED LEADERSHIP

The manner in which a campaign is organized has a profound effect on virtually all other aspects of a campaign. Social campaigns can achieve longevity if they work within a highly centralized organizational structure that already has adequate resources. Another organizational structure that can help campaigns achieve longevity is distributed action, where there are no leaders, but there is a strong foundational support that equally distributes power and responsibility among all participants.

Social campaigns exist on a continuum of structure. On one side of the spectrum are social campaigns that possess a fully bureaucratized and formal leadership structure, while the other side sees very diffuse, horizontal, and decentralized campaigns devoid of any formal leadership. While they may lack official leadership, some of these decentralized campaigns are quite organized and may be more accurately described as possessing a structure of distributed action, where power and responsibility is distributed evenly among all participants. Distributed action should not be confused with dividing task responsibilities among individuals who perform defined and separate organizational roles. Rather, any group member may assume leadership at any time by taking action that either facilitates goal accomplishment or maintains positive relationships. The selection of organizational structure is not always deliberate and in many cases, fluid. In any event, how a campaign is organized from a structural standpoint has a direct influence on virtually every other significant aspect of a particular campaign, and plays a key role in longevity.

With few exceptions, the majority of the case studies analyzed were decentralized. For social campaigns such as Idle No More or 15M, the core belief of each campaign that no one person or group of people should hold power, led the campaigns to intentionally adopt a decentralized structure. In the case of Idle No More, this led to multiple Idle No More chapters operating largely independently of one another across Canada, and eventually, around the world. In the case of 15M, each of Spain's major cities and later its neighbourhoods, had their own occupations and assemblies, which met in Madrid at the Sol General Assembly at regular intervals throughout the year to discuss their progress and share ideas. According to a 15M participant, this structure “allowed us to experiment with the direct and participatory decision-making that we wished to see in Spain as a whole. It encouraged participation.”

As both of these case studies illustrate, the choice to embrace a horizontal organizational structure was a deliberate choice designed to align each campaign's day-to-day operations with their underlying ideological commitments. In doing so, they were organizing in such a way that they could enact the kind of social relations they wished to see in both Canada and Spain as a whole. Since this design encouraged participation and was intended to see all participants as equal, it decreased the costs of action.

Unlike Idle No More however, 15M possessed a structure of distributed action, which accounted a great deal for why it achieved a greater degree of success and longevity. Each occupation in the plaza was comprised of committees, tasked with overseeing the day-to-day activities of the occupations such as logistics and medical care; working groups that

---

4 Interview with Anonymous 15M participant (February 15, 2015).
developed proposals on thematic issue areas such as the economy and sustainability; and assemblies that organized to vote on the proposals. While there was no leader of the movement, there was certainly organization, which was lacking in the case of Idle No More. For instance, by June 2011, approximately one month after the occupations of Spain’s main plazas, it became clear that the police were going to dismantle the camps and that the encampments could not last indefinitely. As a result, the movement made a concerted strategic decision to no longer call for participants to “toma la plaza” (“take the square”) and instead summoned them to “toma los barrios” (“take the neighbourhoods”). As the movement became even more decentralized, participants noted that their neighbourhood assemblies were comprised of much more homogenous and flexible groups of people that tended to make decisions more swiftly.

Additionally, the neighbourhood assemblies addressed issues that were more salient for that particular barrio. In Mortalez, a neighbourhood east of Madrid, an older population meant that issues related to health and pensions were atop the agenda. In San Blas, the neighbourhood assembly created a Time Bank, which allows neighbours to exchange services amongst themselves without money in order to put economic power back in local hands. Here, a decentralized structure of distributed action proved enormously effective because those who were most familiar with a particular problem in a barrio were also those who were most qualified to fix it. The success of distributed action was greatly aided by digital tools, which tend to be democratizing by nature. For instance, those individuals who could not physically be present to vote at assemblies could do so through online tools such as Tweetometro, which allowed citizens to vote via Twitter. While lacking top-down leadership, 15M succeeded in both sharing ownership and possessing a strategic direction because of distributed action and the structures in place to ensure its existence, and clever exploitation of digital tools.

While the 15M case challenges the orthodoxy that social action requires identifiable leaders, decentralization and distributed action are not without problems. For instance, 15M had a highly trusted membership and a great deal of momentum and ideology to leverage as it decentralized into the neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, even in some cases, this meant that some barrios saw smaller numbers of participants than others, or so few participants and apathy that neighbourhood assemblies do not exist at all. If campaigns are unsure of the commitment level of their members, this may prove unsuccessful because it will bring about leadership diffusion and disorganization.

Some campaigns originated as more vertically structured movements before decentralizing. For instance, Occupy Central became a more diffuse movement once the campaign began to adopt a more direct action approach in 2014, with student groups becoming much more active during and after the referendum. It was the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) and the student activist group Scholarism that instigated the first public sit-in on July 1st, 2014, following the annual protest of Hong Kong’s return to mainland China’s control. Slated as a “rehearsal” for OCLP actions in the ensuing months, this action resulted in over 500 arrests. As a result, public support was galvanized in favour of the sit-ins and media attention began to shift from the original leader of the movement, Professor Tai, to the two university students at the helm of both student groups. Tai stated that the OCLP was not opposed to this development and felt that all of their efforts in the years leading up to the Umbrella Movement laid a stable foundational “spirit.” This case illustrates that even movements with leaders can become diffuse in ways that bring benefits to the overall achievement of a particular goal; however, leaders should be aware of the potential loss of control they will have over a campaign and the manner in which media attention may shift elsewhere.

Given the culture and success of anti-leadership and distributed action illustrated by these particular campaigns, it is useful to discuss controls that can be adopted to combat the emergence of leaders. One check is the use of consensus decision-making. In the 15M case, each member was able

---


2) Interview with Benny Tai Yiu-ting, OCLP Founder, (March 11, 2015).
to voice his or her opinion on proposals put forward at various assemblies, and proposals were not passed unless everyone agreed. According to participants, this method created shared understandings through discussions and allowed diverse groups of people to bridge differences, equalized the distribution of power in the group, and created decisions that were representative of the larger community. “It felt like we had ownership over the process,” explained one participant who belonged to the communications committee for the assembly in Barcelona. However, while an effective method of controlling the emergence of leaders, there are a number of drawbacks that social campaigns must consider. Firstly, given the thousands of people gathered in each plaza, the process slowed the making of any decisions. The same 15M participant in Barcelona explained, “We spent hours arguing about nuances. Some people who belonged to anarchist groups were used to this decision-making process, but lots of people were not and became discouraged because it took so long to make such a small decision.” In situations where the members of a campaign lack commitment, there is low trust, great polarization, a lack of information available, and most importantly, an emergency that ensures limited time is available to make a decision, other decision-making processes might be considered. Campaigns that wish to prevent the rise of leaders should certainly consider the use of consensus decision-making as a tactic; however, they should also be cognizant of the degree to which it increases fatigue and the costs of participation.

An additional control that could be implemented to ensure campaigns lack a leader is role rotation. Some campaigns, such as the 15M movement, used rotating moderators and rotating spokespeople to ensure that no one person or group of people monopolized speaking time and the decision-making process, or emerged as a public face of the movement in the press. Given the costs of participation connected to the use of consensus decision-making, utilizing role rotation is a better idea provided the campaign is large enough and people are willing to temporarily take on the responsibility. While the benefits to decentralization are numerous, vertically structured campaigns also possess certain advantages. I Paid a Bribe was launched by Janaagraha, a non-profit organization that was founded in 2001. In this case, its recognizable brand played a key role in encouraging citizen participation, since it had already demonstrated success through previous work and had a staff and resources to dedicate solely to this project. It is worth noting that there are a number of international I Paid A Bribe ‘spin-offs’ around the world in countries such as Pakistan, Kenya, and Greece. While none of these campaigns are directly associated with or receive funding from I Paid a Bribe India, the group in charge of I Paid a Bribe India is currently developing a universal and coordinated network of I Paid a Bribe tools, with the Indian platform acting as “a mothership.” While other countries will be able to utilize this software program, the original source-code will stay in and be maintained by India. Here, the challenge is that India must vet requesting organizations to ensure institutional integrity and to ensure legal isolation from potential foreign defamation charges. As a centralized group with a solid reputation, growing the operation will come with some risks.

As these cases illustrate, the manner in which a campaign is structured plays a large role in longevity. For civil society groups that already have an established vertical organizational structure, adequate resources, and a well-developed brand or reputation, it may not be worth adopting an entirely different structure. If campaigns have an ideological ethos that precludes them from structuring themselves vertically, then a structure of distributed action has also proven quite effective for campaign longevity as the 15M case illustrates; however, campaign organizers should be cognizant of both the risks of leadership diffusion and the controls that can be adopted to ensure responsibility and power are truly evenly distributed among their participants.

---

7 Interview with a member of 15M Barcelona communications committee (March 2, 2015).
8 Ibid.
10 Interview with Venkatesh Kannaiah, Content Head – Jamaonline (March 1, 2015).
11 Interview with Sylvia Veeraraghavan, Coordinator – Jamaonline (March 2, 2015).
Ensuring consistent and accurate portrayal of a campaign’s beliefs, goals, and strategies is a challenging but integral task. As campaigns evolve over time, and increase in size and scope, maintaining control of the message becomes a sensitive balancing act. Some campaigns blossom into larger, less organized movements with different goals and agendas when organizers lose control of initial purposes. Other campaigns wane into obscurity when their messages are disjointed and co-opted.

While many factors explain the relative successful control of messaging by campaigns, a significant indicator is its organizational structure. The case of Idle No More highlights this clearly. With a highly decentralized and democratized structure, the campaign was unable to clearly focus its message. The lack of centralized structure also led to the #IdleNoMore brand being co-opted by parties not affiliated or aligned with the campaign. These co-optation actions reduced the campaign’s legitimacy as citizens lost value in the scattered signal. This phenomenon highlights the double-edged implications of achieving a top trending social media hashtag.

Despite consisting of a diverse multitude of civil society organizations and independent citizens, 15M succeeded in maintaining control of the message where Idle No More did not. 15M had a markedly different structure with organizational tools designed for message unity and campaign longevity. The campaign used a system of rotating moderators and rotating spokespeople to ensure that no one group or person could manipulate the message for their own purposes. This unique organizational tool succeeding in protecting 15M’s brand from co-optation, ensuring a centralized ethos of messaging while maintaining the decentralized structure akin to their principle goals of inclusive democracy. The campaign also developed strategic decisions by process of consensus, allowing consistent and controlled messaging by the diverse actors.

The consensus process did come with one notable challenge: decision-making was slow and cumbersome. The movement’s slogan “Vamos lentos porque vamos lejos” (“We’re going slowly because we’re going far”) indicates a vastly different approach than the fast but short-lived nature of the Idle No More campaign. These two cases show the organizational considerations needed for controlling a campaign’s message.

As demonstrated by the Idle No More campaign, losing control may spell undesirable changes to the trajectory and effectiveness of a campaign. The We Are All Khaled Said case illustrates the evolution of a campaign’s goals when uncontrolled. The initial strong and unifying message of the campaign was focused on public opposition to police brutality; however, when comments and conversations by citizens on social media platforms began focusing more on political views for the new leader (and less on police brutality), the discussions became highly divisive. The campaign’s social media administrators could have controlled the conversation on the platform, but chose not to. Instead, certain actors wielded the platform for their own political views and strategic goals. This decision disrupted the trajectory of citizens’ communication and drastically changed the goals and tone of the campaign, eventually playing a small part in the political regime change. The irony, as Professor Iskandar says, is that police brutality continued throughout the regime change. 

12 Interview with Adel Iskandar, Ph. D., Associate Professor at Simon Frasier University, Department of Communications (March 10, 2015)
This case illustrates how a lack of control can lead to a diversion from originally stated goals. Of course, We Are All Khaled Said did provide momentum for direct change within Egypt, however it has not succeeded in changing police brutality. As a campaign matures, careful consideration and effort should be expended on keeping engaged activists on track, as it is difficult to leverage disjointed support to achieve original goals.

Maintaining control of the message is also challenging when working alongside other organizations or actors as part of a coalition. Sometimes, a campaign's message can be altered in coalitions when some actors wield more influence or power than others. An example of this is with the Global Dialogue with Iran, where campaign funding came from government. The language used in all of the campaign sites and platforms differed greatly from the messages crafted by Canadian politicians at the campaign's launch. Although the non-governmental organizations leading the campaign focused solely on Iranian citizens and the provision of tools for human rights purposes, Canadian politicians used the campaign to target the Iranian government. This is an important example for other campaigns that wish to receive some funding from governmental bodies, as the message they may be attempting to convey can be different than the talking points of governments, leading to mixed-messages and the possibility of lost support.

Should a campaign be isolated from the above challenges, a centralized messaging tool is helpful in illustrating wide support for your campaign. The People’s Climate March for instance, utilized a clever social media aggregator called Tint. The tool allowed PCM to display focused social media material on their website (PeoplesClimate.org), filtering messages by locations, keywords, and hashtags. This allowed PCM to sieve out and broadcast the main message of its campaign, while allowing the larger social media sphere to continue. The use of Tint, or a related tool, would have helped Idle No More mitigate the co-optation of the #IdleNoMore brand.

In conclusion, maintaining control of the message is a vital aspect of ensuring the longevity and success of a campaign. Without control, campaigns risk losing continued will and support from activists, as co-optation tactics increase disruptive noise and drown out the original signal that spurred mobilization. Some form of organizational structure or centralized leadership greatly improves the ability for campaigns to control the message, as purely decentralized movements are highly susceptible to change.

SECTION 4.04: PROTECT PARTICIPANTS FROM PHYSICAL RISKS

Physical risks are an ever-present concern for campaign participants, particularly in undemocratic countries or countries with a history of violence against civil society. Campaign organizers should ensure participants are aware of the physical risks associated with participation, and take steps to mitigate physical risks whenever possible.

Physical risk has long been an analyzed component of social campaigns. Our research uncovered numerous examples of physical risk that affected protestors and organizers alike.

The potential for physical harm is greater in countries or regions with fewer democratic freedoms and oppressive governments. The We Are All Khaled Said campaign and the Umbrella Movement are most representative of this, as tear gas and police brutality were used to corral those who participated in the occupations. While few campaigns completed any risk assessments to better understand the possibilities of physical violence, the few campaign leaders who did conduct assessments stated that it was an important responsibility of campaign organizers.13

Occupy Central with Love and Peace is a perfect example of this. OCLP prepared documents and mechanisms in an

---

13 Interview with Benny Tai Yiu-ting, OCLP Founder, (March 11, 2015)
attempt to alleviate the physical risks to participants. The Manual for Disobedience was available on the OCLP website in both English and Cantonese long before the occupation portion of the campaign was slated to begin, informing protestors of the legal framework for their actions and the necessity of non-violence for both the achievement of the ultimate goals of the campaign and the general safety of the participants. The Manual advised participants to bring items such as goggles for teargas and pepper spray to the campaign. When asked about the perceived impact of the manual, Tai described it as “one of the things that caused the movement to be able to maintain the peaceful spirit.” He also predicted, “Distributing it will have an effect (in other campaigns and environments).”

Examples of draft text-messages for protestors to create were also provided in the case of arrest to inform friends and families of one’s detention as seen in Figure 1. Additionally, Chan, another campaign founder, said, “Volunteer lawyers, 80 social workers and 160 medical helpers will be on site to assist protesters.” This helped to safeguard against potential police abuses while in custody due to a rapid response in legal representation, and just as significantly signaled to the protestors that the campaign organizers were concerned about their individual safety, which resulted in wider buy-in and sustained support.

Similarly, some of the 15M protestors were cognizant of the fact that the police may exercise force to dismantle the initial occupations. As a result, protestors were advised by organizers to use their mobile phone cameras to capture this violence being exerted on non-violent protestors, and then to leverage digital tools such as Facebook, Twitter, and live-streaming sites to disseminate these images and videos.

The Indignados spread awareness of this tactic through images such as Figure 2. Videotaping increased significantly and gave participants the ability to show the police brutality to the wider public and media, garnering greater support and greater police accountability.

**Figure 2**

**Physical Risk Mitigation in Less-Democratic Countries**

In less democratic countries where government responses cannot be predicted by their general legality, physical risks are substantially higher. Wael Ghonim, co-founder of the We Are All Khaled Siad Facebook page, was secretly detained for twelve days. Reports of arbitrary arrest and police violence

---

15 Email Correspondence with Benny Tai Yiu-ting, OCLP Founder (March 21, 2015)
16 Ibid.
were also prevalent throughout the entire campaign.

Psiphon Inc., which utilized their free Psiphon circumvention software platform for the GDFI to allow participants within Iran to engage in uncensored discussion, acknowledges that physical risk exists even in the online space. Psiphon clearly promotes itself as a censorship circumvention tool that should not be used for anonymity, and thus leaves the decision to the participants on whether to assume the risk of engaging in the campaign. Psiphon users risk possible detention or arrest, should they be identified as a user by the Iranian government. This example of an organization clearly stating the risks and rewards to the participant in a campaign is another suggested approach for organizers, so that they do not place unknowing participants in harm’s way.

Campaigns in conflict zones understandably present the largest amount of physical risk to organizers and participants, and in Avaaz’s Syria campaign, death and injury occurred. An expert interviewed on information controls noted that he thinks that failing to perform an extensive risk assessment before starting the campaign was irresponsible, as the organization publicly broadcasted their efforts to break export laws through smuggling technology across borders. Nevertheless, Ricken Patel, the founder of Avaaz, asserts that while Avaaz was “involved in the operation and [they] supported the co-ordination of it,” they do not accept all responsibility for the events that unfolded, as they “didn’t make the final decision.”

Despite the contextual difference between Egypt, Hong Kong, Iran, and Spain, precautionary actions like the examples listed above during the Umbrella Movement, GDFI, and 15M can be employed by campaign organizers to help mitigate physical risks of the participants in even the most oppressive political circumstances or rapidly expanding campaigns. Analysis of OCLP in particular reveals that it is useful to inform participants of the possible physical risks associated with their involvement ahead of time, as it served to produce a remarkably peaceful occupation, and a continued support base as the pro-democracy movement considers its next steps.

SECTION 4.05: PROTECT PARTICIPANTS FROM DIGITAL RISKS

Digital surveillance and direct cyber-attacks are a prevalent and increasing risk to social campaigns globally, and heightened awareness and precautions should be taken in all campaign contexts.

Surveillance and Spying Malware

Advanced digital infiltration and surveillance technology has heightened the risk of governments monitoring the computers and mobile devices of protestors significantly. Numerous social campaigns studied had long periods of Internet outages and loss of mobile communications, which disrupted communications between campaign participants; however, it was the surveillance and direct digital attacks that were the most prominent and impactful risks.

Wiretapping of phones was also widely reported by key figures involved in numerous case studies. Both the campaign organizers of OCLP and street level protestors note indications of potential surveillance and their repercussions. Occupy Central showed multiple accounts of monitoring and arrests due to the technological superiority of the Chinese government. This includes street level protestors being refused entry into mainland China after their identities were somehow connected to the Umbrella Movement, definitive phone-tapping of the OCLP leaders, and indicative sounds

---

19 Interview with an expert on Syria and Syrian Information Controls. (March 6, 2015).
and obstructions noted by the founder of Translating the Umbrella Movement, Arthur Lo Man Ki. Arthur stated that he experienced delayed connection times, echoes, and interfering noise on his mobile phone well into January 2015, over a month after the occupation officially ended.

This does not just occur in non- or quasi-democratic countries either. Idle No More organizer Clayton Thomas Muller was placed under surveillance by the Canadian RCMP since 2011. Muller was called at his home by the RCMP during the height of the Idle No More movement, completely without cause or reason and despite the legal nature of campaign he was participating in. This risk in more stable democracies is largely weighed in a cost-benefit analysis and is not considered an immediate threat by those interviewed.

Much more pervasive phishing attacks were also observed in our research, and are aimed at getting protestors to download malware that would allow the distributor of the virus to observe and manipulate almost all functions of a cellphone. During the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, this type of attack was distributed through WeChat, a popular messaging system in both Hong Kong and the mainland. As Figure 3 illustrates, the attack pretends to come from CODE4HK and notes that it will make Umbrella Movement coordination easier. In reality, it attempted to identify some of the hundreds of thousands of protestors at the occupation at any given time. There was no available data to know how many individuals downloaded this particular malware.

**Denial-of-Service and Other Cyber-Attacks**

In Hong Kong, the initial public referendum launched in June 2014 was the first cyber-attack victim. Three days before the poll was to begin, the popvote.hk website was hit with possibly “the largest and most sophisticated denial-of-service attacks in the Internet’s history” according to the Internet security firm Cloudfare.

![Figure 3](https://secure.avaaz.org/en/massive_attack_on_avaaz_a/?slideshow)

**Figure 3**

Similar attacks continued throughout the Umbrella Movement. Media websites based in Hong Kong reporting on the protests were also subjected to Direct Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. The attack on the website Inmediahk.net specifically sent almost 10 million more page queries to the website on October 3rd, 2014, than the past week’s daily average, immobilizing the site and forcing them offline until servers could be fixed. This spike is shown in the Cloudfare analytics seen in Figure 4 above.

![Figure 4](https://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240231950/China-targets-HK-protestors-with-Android-and-iOS-spyware)

**Figure 4**

Media websites based in Hong Kong reporting on the protests were also subjected to Direct Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. The attack on the website Inmediahk.net specifically sent almost 10 million more page queries to the website on October 3rd, 2014, than the past week’s daily average, immobilizing the site and forcing them offline until servers could be fixed. This spike is shown in the Cloudfare analytics seen in Figure 4 above.

Similarly, there were numerous digital risks that organizations and individuals participating in Avaaz’s Syria campaign were exposed to, some of which were anticipated and mitigated. While Avaaz experienced targeted attacks, with the organization’s central webpage down for 44 hours, Avaaz noted that they “were expecting this.” In Avaaz’s campaign in Syria however, the organization’s infrastructure helped to protect the anonymity and digital security of various citizen journalists through the use of encrypted satellite hubs and phones. While the organization sought to mitigate risks, this protection was still not absolute.

---

23 Interview with Arthur Lo Man Ki, founder of Translating the Umbrella Movement (March 9, 2015).
24 Ibid.
The Internet Ungovernance Forum campaign was partially focused on holding workshops designed to inform participants and activists about how to utilize tools for data protection, secure communication, censorship circumvention, and personal anonymity. Organizations like Tactical Tech taught best practices, while tools like Psiphon and Bitmask were discussed. The further awareness and dissemination of tools and tactics such as these during protests did mitigate the extent to which digital attacks were successful, and efforts by campaigns to promote secure and anonymous messaging services such as Telegram will help to further improve digital and physical safety. Unfortunately, a recent bill passed by Turkish parliament giving government ministers the authority to remove web material “deemed a threat to national security, or liable to cause public disorder,” as well as a new report detailing the government’s increased crackdowns on independent journalism, illustrate the poor digital environment despite the attempts of the campaigns. This only heightens the need for greater digital security awareness by campaign organizers and participants.

All of these examples of explicit digital risks were identified in just a small sample size of 11 case studies, and reveal a very significant challenge to current social campaigns. While identifying the true identities and capabilities of the nefarious actors isn’t always possible, non-profit organizations such as the Citizen Lab and the Open Network Initiative are doing incredible work in that exact area, while also working to better protect and equip civil society groups against their much more powerful opposition. We recommend that campaign organizers study the work of these institutions and equip their participants with the best tools to mitigate digital risks.

SECTION 4.06: PREPARE TO SCALE RAPIDLY

To capitalize on the rapid growth of a campaign that often results from the amplificatory nature of digital tools and social media, organizers should develop proper organizational and digital structures.

A key goal for many movements is to raise awareness and attract attention to a specific cause. With the use of digital tools and the amplificatory potential of tools such as Twitter, the ability to successfully spread campaign content via these mediums can be extremely influential in helping a campaign grow quickly. A large component of a campaign’s ability to ensure this long-term and sustainable growth is to recognize the importance of scalability. Campaign organizers must consequently be prepared by providing sufficient “on-ramps” or spaces for participants to engage directly with the campaign.

A key component of capturing short-term growth for long-term success is developing proper structures at the outset of a campaign. While Idle No More possessed a central group of founders, the campaign did not have a definitive organizational structure to coordinate resources and set a clear and cohesive strategic direction for the campaign once its support base grew exponentially. Conversely, the PCM had a more definite organizational structure with lead organizations in the coalition such as 350.org with permanent staff. With this structure, the organizers were better able to establish a strategic direction and logistical concerns for the campaign that would eventually draws millions of participants around the world. However, Stuart Basden, President of 350.org Toronto, has also noted that 350.org Toronto did not have sufficient “on-ramps” for citizen engagement in the organization in the surge of interest and support received following the march as the organization tripled in a year.

29 Interview with Emma Ruby-Sachs, Deputy Director of Avaaz. (February 6, 2015).
30 Interview with an expert on Syria and Syrian Information Controls. (March 6, 2015).
31 Telegram “Homepage” Retrieved from https://telegram.org/
33 Interview with Stuart Basden, President of 350.org Toronto (February 26, 2015).
In addition to organizational structures, campaign organizers should also consider an effective platform that is managed by the campaign in order to facilitate the scaling from interest to commitment. For example, Idle No More’s digital presence lacked the requisite structure to support its long-term growth. From its outset, Idle No More grew at an incredibly fast pace through social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook. However, the campaign lacked a central digital platform to manage its communications and coordination. The initial website was relatively simple and not designed to facilitate the recruitment and coordination of volunteers, supporters, and other resources. This platform deficiency allowed Idle No More’s brand to be co-opted by entirely separate organizations and individuals, creating legitimacy challenges for the campaign.

Conversely, the PCM was able to capitalize on the 1 billion impressions on Twitter alone and the subsequent digital attention as the campaign had a centralized website. The central website not only contained integral information on the logistics surrounding the march itself, but was also used as a central hub for social media posts. By using a social media aggregator tool called Tint, the PCM was able to control the message through this centralized hub, unlike the Idle No More campaign. While the campaign organizers stopped filtering the posts that would appear on the central website as tweets averaged three tweets per second during the march, the organizers continued to have that capacity if the need were to arise.34

As digital strategist Mark Blevis puts it, “Without these structures, a campaign stands the risk of becoming like a bonfire stoked with gasoline. They will burn bright and strong for a short-period of time, but without a proper underlying structure, they will not burn for long.”35 As rapid growth has become a common feature of modern campaigns due to the wider reach digital tools and social media offer, campaign organizers must be prepared for this growth by creating supportive organizational and digital structures to facilitate sufficient engagement and spaces for participants as their numbers are able to expand at unforeseen rates.

24 Interview with Mark Blevis, President of Full Duplex Digital Public Affairs (February 20, 2015).
Social movements and collective action are not novel phenomena: from early labour movements, culturally focused ‘new social movements,’ to the many examples of citizen mobilization in the Global South, people have often united over shared goals. Likewise, the Internet and other digital tools have had major transformative effects on all aspects of social, political, and economic life. This report provides an earnest analysis of digitally empowered social campaigns. After conducting in-depth research of our 11 target campaigns, three major ‘high-level’ findings stood out: leveraging digital tools for impact, the structural needs to achieve longevity, and the inherent tension between impact and longevity.

In the first section, our analysis shows the strategies and tactics used by campaigns successful in achieving certain degrees of impact. Here, a major difference between successful campaigns and unsuccessful campaigns was the effective use of digital tools in transferring campaign support into large-scale participation, and ultimately, distributed action. The second section focused on the structural and organizational considerations campaigns must make to best prepare themselves for longevity. Additionally, our findings detailed the importance for campaigns to develop a framework comprised of both short-term and long-term goals.

Perhaps what is most compelling from these two sections is how at odds they are with one another. Campaigns that focused on specific, measurable, and achievable impact often found support dissipating after meeting their goals. Since they typically exist within a broader movement (or at least an eco-system of like-minded actors), campaigns that achieve major impact quickly risk waning participation. Conversely, campaigns that target longevity through overreliance on long-term goals and particular organizational structures diminish their ability to maximize impact. Of course, this has a negative effect on fostering support and participation, which is also vital for ensuring longevity. With this in mind, activists must strategically decide if shorter, more direct-action oriented campaigns, or longer-term citizen movements with more conceptual goals best serve their ambitions.

Ultimately, our hope is that activist groups, aggrieved citizens, and aspiring campaign organizers can learn from this report how to build successful campaigns and to what extent digital tools can help them to do so. Nevertheless, its findings will be useful for other groups wishing to better understand or engage with social campaigns as well.

Conclusion

SECTION 5:
Avaaz is an online platform used to “organize citizens of all nations to close the gap between the world we have and the world most people everywhere want.” Entirely donor funded, Avaaz launched their “Break the Blackout” campaign in Syria in 2011 to equip Syrians with satellite modems and camera phones to aid in broadcasting human rights abuses. Avaaz later turned to provide food, medicine, and humanitarian relief to those in need.

I. BACKGROUND
Nationwide protests erupted in Syria in March 2011 through a number of anti-government demonstrations targeted towards the Ba'athist government and President Bashar al-Assad. Assad’s regime subsequently violently suppressed these protests with massive crackdowns and pervasive censorship. In response to these violent crackdowns, a lack of Internet connectivity throughout the country with Internet and power outages, and a general media void, Avaaz sought to assist citizen journalists to disseminate footage and reports of atrocities.

II. THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
Avaaz’s campaign in Syria had very clear and explicit goals throughout the campaign. As Ricken Patel articulates, the campaign in Syria was “about trying to sustain the network of citizen journalists that are telling the world the story of the horror show that is going on in Syria, trying to get humanitarian aid in and trying to mobilize the right kind of international action.” At the onset, Avaaz’s goal was to provide Syrians with the ability to communicate and disseminate videos and photos of human rights abuses. The specific goals subsequently evolved to training individuals on the ground how to verify their information. The campaign pivoted to providing humanitarian aid such as integral medical supplies. While they shifted scope, these goals were emphasized and highlighted in all e-blasts Avaaz sent to solicit donations.

Structure
Avaaz’s structure is reflective of the organization’s core mandate to build a stable constituency that spans across countries and throughout time. As an incorporated 501(c)4 non-profit, the organization has a very clear organizational structure comprised of a CEO/Founder, head campaigners, and various experts from around the world. Avaaz had a relatively stable program budget of $8.9 million in 2013 to support these staff members and various campaigns.

APPENDIX 1.01: AVAAZ’S CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA

3 Ibid.
**Digital tools used**

- Email blasts: Avaaz focuses on “authentic and clear communication” and treat their “members like Presidents and Prime Ministers.”
- Crowdsourcing funds: the organization capitalizes on the mobility and speed of the flow of money through crowdsourcing funds from their members for all campaigns, to make their operations possible.
- Provision of satellite hubs: the campaign provided satellite hubs that would connect Syrian citizen journalists with outside news sources. This proved advantageous as CNN was getting approximately 80% of their coverage from these journalists.
- International membership: use of the Internet to create an extensive membership that spans borders (ie) 1.2 million Canadian members, 500,000 Egyptian members, etc.

**Non-digital tools used**

- Demonstrating exact impact: Avaaz found that if people understand the precise effect of their support, they were most likely to donate to the cause.
- Appeal to emotions: Avaaz often appeals to individual emotions through video appeals for instance, to assist the featured journalist.
- Flexibility: Avaaz capitalizes on their ability to be flexible with tactics and tools they use in each campaign in order to better address the situation at hand.
- Use of a variety of languages: Avaaz currently campaigns in 15 different languages.

**III. RESULTS**

Ricken Patel notes that this campaign “has been one of our community’s finest moments.” Avaaz often publicly highlights that 80% of footage on Syria was facilitated by the Avaaz campaign, an indicator that Avaaz achieved their goal of supporting citizen journalists to disseminate information. Nevertheless, while the atrocities continue in Syria, Avaaz has stopped the “Break the Blackout” campaign.

---

5 Interview with Emma Ruby-Sachs, Campaigner at Avaaz. (February 6, 2015).
6 Ibid.
10 Interview with Emma Ruby-Sachs, Campaigner at Avaaz. (February 6, 2015).
Change.org is an online petition platform that has gained widespread popularity since its launch in 2007. It currently boasts 70 million users in 196 countries. Campaigns may be led by an individual or an organization and Change.org provides the platform and tools for creating campaigns. Our research has focused on petitions that have gained attention for issues relating to labour concerns. This includes the following cases: a petition started by a concerned individual who was appalled by the labour conditions that were reported in factories that Apple was using, a petition started by an organization called China Labor Watch that opposed child labor in Samsung factories, and a petition that gained a lot of support for Earth Works and was meant to get Costco on board with their No Dirty Gold campaign.

i) BACKGROUND
Although launched in 2007, it wasn’t until 2011 that Change.org focused its efforts on the petitions that it is now well known for. The founder, Ben Rattray, wanted to create a platform that would address the “disconnect between policymaking and everyday people”\(^\text{11}\) When it was launched, its primary feature was crowdfunding by being a host for organizations to list their projects, then it tried becoming a social networking tool, and then a fully fledged blogging site for progressive causes.\(^\text{12}\) After realizing that signing petitions was gaining attention, Change.org reformatted and became highly successful. The website gains the most signatures for issues related to animals, human rights and economic justice. We chose to focus on petitions related to labor rights, ones that have reached their conclusion and that we could evaluate from beginning to end.

ii) THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
Change.org is “the world’s largest petition platform, empowering people everywhere to create the change they want to see”\(^\text{13}\) according to their site. Each petition has a space for an explanation of the goals and to tell a story, a letter which is sent to a decision maker, a space for comments by signers and for the petition creator or a member of Change.org’s staff to add in updates. Each petition has specific “asks” that it is requesting from the decision makers. An example of an ask from the petition made by China Labor Watch is “Children who have worked at the factory should be compensated for their previous work and returned to school. Finally, Samsung should establish an independent hotline for workers to report labor violations to prevent this abuse from occurring again.”\(^\text{14}\)

Image by Barb Darrow from www.gigaom.com


\(^{12}\) Ibid.


Digital tools used

- Petitions: these feature space for the message, letter to the decision maker, a bar to show amount of signatures, a timeline of updates and signer comments and social plug-ins for easy sharing.
- Email Blasts: highly calculated email blasts using extensive testing, such as real-time testing (10-10-80), long-term testing (A-B split) and multivariate testing, to a large set of email addresses.
- Centralized website: all petitions on all topics can be found on one place, help page, FAQs, and tips and resources are all here.
- Social media plug ins: ability to share once you've signed a petition.
- Blogs: operates a blog for Change.org generally and also for paid users.
- Webinars: hosts webinars to educate users
- Does not operate any servers in its offices and “zero staff” dedicated solely for information technology. ¹⁵
- Runs backend analytics and business intelligence on Amazon Elastic Map Reduce (EMR) and front-end web analytics on Google Analytics and MixPanel. ¹⁶

Non-digital tools used

- Events: events such as petitions drops are sometimes coordinated in parallel with petitions.
- Employs paid staff members.

III. RESULTS

Change.org employs a growing staff and has income from petitions that they are paid to promote. For the petitions that were examined: Petition on Apple factories: 256,418 signatures, confirmed victory. Apple made moves to change its procurement and labor processes.

Petition on child labor in Samsung factory: 159,385 signatures, no victory declared. Samsung reacted to the allegations from China Labor Watch by conducting their own audits of the factory in question. They also instituted their “zero tolerance” policy for child labor, which China Labor Watch claimed could have “devastating” effects if Samsung chooses to withdraw from factories instead of working to ensure there are no child workers. ¹⁷

Petition on No Dirty Gold campaign urging Costco to sell Ethical Gold: 29,537 signatures, no victory declared. EarthWorks, who runs the No Dirty Gold Campaign, was able to attract thousands of signatories and “flooded Costco’s Facebook page and email inboxes with message urging them to join the “No Dirty Gold” campaign” but Costco has yet to sign on. ¹⁸

¹⁷ Interview with Kevin Slaten, Program Coordinator for China Labor Watch (March 5, 2015).
The Global Dialogue on the Future of Iran was a global, multi-event based freedom of expression and human rights campaign that ran for over a year beginning in May 2013. The campaign sought to provide Iranian citizens with uncensored access to online platforms that facilitated discussion on their aspirations for the political, social and economic future of their country. Surveys and other feedback mechanisms from Iranians themselves then went on to determine content in future live events hosted around the world on topics such as human rights, entrepreneurship, and communications technology.

I. Background

On May 10th, 2013, the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto launched “The Global Dialogue on the Future of Iran” (GDFI). Although funding for the initial seed money for the campaign came from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) through a project proposal, all the organizations working on the development and implementation of the actual campaign itself were independent of any government interference. This case study does provide a unique context and an outlier example from the other ten studied, as it can partially reveal what effects the source of a campaigns funding may have on the perception of legitimacy and, ultimately, success of a campaign. In this case, there was no evidence of a mitigating effect on the Iranians who participated in this campaign.

Since the Green Movement erupted following Iran’s disputed 2009 election of President Ahmadinejad, internet surveillance and censorship has increased significantly, both through “technical filtration tools with legal frameworks and information manipulation.” The initial launch of the campaign was a much publicized conference with prominent Iranian diaspora members both present and accessing the entire event online. Two weeks after the initial GDFI event, the digital tools and platforms used to engage directly with Iranian citizens enabled more than 360,000 unique users to visit the GDFI website over 1,490,000 times.

II. THE CAMPAIGN

Goals

The Global Dialogue on the Future of Iran states its goal as “creating a space for dialogue among Iranians on the future of Iran,” which is a much different goal than other campaigns in this project. To achieve this goal, the Global Dialogue created online discussions and coinciding live events with the intent to a) determine what interests and concerns the Iranian citizens themselves had with respect to their country’s future and to b) generate discussion globally based on the participant feedback with multi-continental events.

Structure

Project design and development was done by the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto who then leveraged their contacts of committed human rights defenders with innovative skills to provide circumvention software in the case of Psiphon and Iranian expertise with ASL19. Both ASL19 - Persian for Article 19 of the United Nations Human Rights Declaration that states the right “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression” – and Psiphon, are principally human rights organization with firmly established users and contacts within Iran. ASL19 mainly distributes open source circumvention tools like Psiphon, provides user support, and distributes information and guides on digital safety to Iranians. Psiphon helps roughly 8-10 million people access uncensored Internet globally by using their application to connect citizens in oppressive countries to access servers not controlled by their respective governments. Psiphon's fundamental support for access to information and existing popularity in Iran made this circumvention platform the best choice for partnership. Also, there was significant stakeholder engagement amongst the Iranian diaspora as well.

---

19 The Citizen Lab. (February 2013)“After the Green Movement.” Open Net Initiative
This coalition involved in these tools and platforms began to facilitate this dialogue with Iranians in order to understand what uncensored and technologically savvy Iranians thought about the future potential of their country. Over the next year, Psiphon and ASL19 collaborated with the Munk School on multiple live events that collaborated with Iranians, as well as 24/7 elections monitoring and analysis for the June 2013 election of President Rouhani and the establishment of the “Rouhani Meter” to track campaign promises. In addition to this, ASL19 provided analysis of online traffic and Psiphon user data in Iran during this time as well. The figure below shows the Iranian governments use of internet throttling that “resulted in an rapid decline of users between May 20th and June 14th,” and “daily Psiphon users dropped by 73 percent from around 375K unique-users on May 20th to a low of around 100K unique-users on the day of the Presidential Elections, June 14, 2013.” Immediately after the elections, Psiphon users in Iran rapidly began surfing the uncensored and unthrottled Internet.

Digital and non-digital tools used
- Psiphon is an open source tool designed to circumvent censorship suffered by millions of Internet users in several countries where freedom of expression is not an innate right and information is manipulated or censored.
- Twitter was used to update interested observers in Iran when events were scheduled as well as to share and spread information amongst the multiple organizations involved.
- Google Moderator was used to aggregate Persian tweets and facilitated feedback and dialogue regarding the campaign. This allowed for direct engagement live during the panel discussion, allowed Iranians direct communication with campaign organizers, and influenced the topic of discussions that would come in the future.
- Online surveys on specially designed platforms reached 19,000 Iranians and helped inform the content and focus of the live events.

III. Results
The success derived from the campaign itself is revealed in the analytics of web users and message boards, which showed over 25 million page views on GDFI related websites. The campaign participants feel that their combined efforts did gain significant interests and participation amongst the Iranian public and diaspora, and served to both hold politicians accountable to their promised reforms, and raised awareness of issues that still need to be addressed. Additionally, the three main organizations involved in the campaign – the Munk School, ASL19, and Psiphon – continue to promote Iranian human rights and access to information through the Digital Public Square project and the Iran Cyber Dialogue.

II. Tools

- Psiphon is an open source tool designed to circumvent censorship suffered by millions of Internet users in several countries where freedom of expression is not an innate right and information is manipulated or censored.
- Twitter was used to update interested observers in Iran when events were scheduled as well as to share and spread information amongst the multiple organizations involved.

III. Results
The success derived from the campaign itself is revealed in the analytics of web users and message boards, which showed over 25 million page views on GDFI related websites. The campaign participants feel that their combined efforts did gain significant interests and participation amongst the Iranian public and diaspora, and served to both hold politicians accountable to their promised reforms, and raised awareness of issues that still need to be addressed. Additionally, the three main organizations involved in the campaign – the Munk School, ASL19, and Psiphon – continue to promote Iranian human rights and access to information through the Digital Public Square project and the Iran Cyber Dialogue.

22 https://rouhanimeter.com/
24 Interview: Sean Willet, Director of Communications, Munk School of Global Affairs. March, 2015.
With the use of a highly effective data visualization platform, I Paid a Bribe leverages user submissions of bribery requests to raise public awareness of corruption in India. The campaign’s combination of short-term and long-term goals has allowed it to convert widespread support into effective distributed action. Its centralized leadership structure, strong brand awareness, and global expansion of its value-laden software platform all contribute to I Paid a Bribe’s longevity.

I. BACKGROUND

Originally launched in 2008, I Paid a Bribe was created by Swati and Ramesh Ramanathan and Sridar Iyengar as a way to track the market price of corruption in India. At first, the website was non-profit organization Janaagraha’s ironic approach to dealing with the prevalent and onerous effects of corruption. Janaagraha, whose mission is improving the quality of citizenship, services and infrastructure in India, began developing I Paid a Bribe further, eventually re-launching a more robust site in 2010.\(^\text{25}\) Relying on traditional media and an on-the-ground promotion campaign throughout communities, I Paid a Bribe successfully developed both domestic and international support for the site.

II. THE CAMPAIGN

Goals

I Paid a Bribe’s overall purpose is tackling corruption using citizen collective action. The goals of the campaign are to:

1. Raise citizen awareness about the existence and spread of bribe-related exchanges, promoting constructive public debate that pressures public officials to reduce and eliminate corruption;
2. Informing citizens to recognize, avoid and tackle bribe paying situations;
3. Identify and analyse the workflows within corruption prone public services, to make suggestions on systemic reform directed at entrenching simpler and more transparent processes, more consistent standards of law enforcement, and better vigilance and regulation.

While all three goals are on-going projects, the campaign has shown positive success in developing digital tools to combat the first two goals. The third goal is more ambitious, yet seeks to funnel citizen awareness for positive institutional change.

Structure

I Paid a Bribe is operated by the Janaagraha organization, and as such, is maintained by a staff of dedicated Janaonline employees. Outside of website maintenance, content creation, verification, and overall strategic direction, Janaagraha also employs a policy advocacy team for process reviews and institutional reforms.\(^\text{26}\) The centralized structure of the organization provides strong foundational support for the campaign's online bribe reporting platform, the source of I Paid a Bribe's true success. With the platform, the campaign leverages a highly decentralized citizen base for its reporting mechanisms, leading to a highly distributed impact structure.

\(^{26}\) Interview: Venkatesh Kannaiah, Content Head – Janaonline (2015, March 3).
Tools and Tactics

Digital Tools Used
- Bribe report visualization platform;
- Website, mobile, and telephone based bribe reporting submission system;\(^{27}\)
- Social media platforms;
- I Did Not Pay a Bribe and I Met an Honest Officer reporting tools;
- Bribe hotline: educates citizens on legal processes and procedures, in order to avoid fines;\(^{28}\)
- Bribe analytics: ability to view developing trends in bribe requests;
- International I Paid a Bribe software platform for new country partners.\(^{29}\)

Non-Digital Tools Used
- Poster campaigns: generating brand awareness and local support;
- Process reviews: analyzing government office processes and advocating reforms that best promote anti-corrupt environments;\(^{30}\)
- Media relations: provide media outlets high-level data on corruption findings, as well as individual bribe cases for increased exposure.\(^{31}\)

III. Results

Results for I Paid a Bribe have been very positive. With over 40,000 reports in 889 cities in India (and counting), the campaign has succeeded in mapping bribe requests (and honest officers) in various regional districts, raising awareness of the overall state of corruption.\(^{32}\) The campaign’s Bribe Hotline has helped citizens become informed of their right to refuse bribery payments, while their process review initiatives have taken positive steps towards institutional and procedural changes in multiple government offices.\(^{33}\) Lastly, their new international I Paid a Bribe software platform has garnered widespread international demand, illustrating the campaign’s respected brand awareness.

---


\(^{30}\) Interview with Sylvia Veeraraghavan, Coordinator at Janaonline (March 6, 2015).

\(^{31}\) Interview with Venkatesh Kannaiah, Content Head at Janaonline (March 3, 2015).


\(^{33}\) Interview with Sylvia Veeraraghavan, Coordinator at Janaonline (March 6, 2015).
Idle No More (INM) is an indigenous rights campaign and movement based in Canada. After starting in November 2012 in the province of Saskatchewan by four women, three native and one non-native, Idle No More experienced significant and rapid growth, which was largely enabled by social media and other digital tools.

I. BACKGROUND
There are roughly 1.4 million indigenous people in Canada, making up roughly four percent of Canada’s total population. As noted by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Rights James Anaya, despite the fact that Canada is a prosperous country it is difficult to reconcile this prosperity “with the human rights problems faced by indigenous peoples in Canada, which have reached crisis proportions in many respects.”

INM emerged in the context of this gap in human rights between indigenous and non-indigenous groups, and the perception that the Canadian government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper was doing more to erode Indigenous rights than to strengthen them. The focal point of this sentiment was the Harper government’s use of large omnibus bills to package contentious legislation related to Indigenous rights alongside key pieces of necessary legislation such as the federal budget.

INM was sparked in late October 2012 when the Harper government introduced budget omnibus Bill C-45, which contained changes to three pieces of legislation related to Canadian Indigenous communities. Critics of Bill C-45 viewed it as not only attacking Indigenous rights, but also as epitomizing the Harper government’s disregard for consultation or cooperation with Indigenous communities.

The introduction of Bill C-45 led Idle No More founders Nina Wilson, Sheelah Mclean, Sylvia McAdam, and Jessica Gordon to stage a mass teach-in at community centre called Station 20 West located in the city of Saskatoon in the province of Saskatchewan. This teach-in was titled “Idle No More” and started the Idle No More campaign and movement.

II. THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
Idle No More developed in such a way that the initial campaign and the larger movement became indistinguishable. According to the Idle No More website, the movement has six current “calls for change.” Some of these are based around specific end-goals, such as causing certain portions of Bill C-45 to be repealed, while others are more general, such as deepening the general level of consultation between the Canadian government and Indigenous communities. These are the goals of a movement, not a specific campaign.

However, the initial development of Idle No More can be seen largely as a campaign against Bill C-45, amongst other Indigenous rights issues. In a December 2012 op-ed, the Idle No More founders call on Idle No More supporters to “resist the impending legislation,” in reference to Bill C-45. As such, while Idle No More’s goals are broadly defined, a core aspect of the movement’s initial campaign was to resist Bill C-45.

Structure
Idle No More evolved in a decentralized and democratized manner, two values which are central to Idle No More’s ideology. While there were a core group of founders and campaign contributors, Idle No More closely adhered to the belief that no one person or group of people would own or exclusively operate Idle No More. This structure led to multiple Idle No More chapters operating largely independently of one another across Canada.

Tactics and tools

Digital tools

- Social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter were prominent tools used to raise awareness of Idle No More amongst the general public, share campaign content amongst supporters, and coordinate protests and other non-digital activities.
- Other digital tools used effectively by INM included blogs, forums, and mobile devices connected to the Internet. Mobile devices were of particular use in connecting localized physical actions, such as protests, to the campaign at large.

Non-digital tools

- Flash mobs, staged in malls and other heavily trafficked public areas, were very effective in garnering public attention.
- Rail and road blockades were particularly contentious tactics used by INM supporters around Canada.
- INM also used mass marches and rallies, sit-ins, and teach-ins.

III. RESULTS

In the short-term, Idle No More attracted significant attention to Indigenous rights in Canada; however, Bill C-45 passed without any amendments to the contested pieces of legislation.

Although Idle No More faded from the public eye in early 2013, the larger movement did not fall apart. Idle No More maintains its decentralized and democratized structure, but it has also instituted more formal decision-making committees related to communications, fundraising and general administration.
Movimiento 15 (15M) was a non-violent, grassroots, anti-austerity and free culture movement that swept across Spain beginning on May 15, 2011. Immediately after the initial demonstrations, thousands of people took over the main squares of Spain’s major cities until the encampments were dismantled in June 2011. Estimates suggest that between 6.5 and 8 million people – collectively known as the Indignados (the Outraged) – participated in the movement in Spain. The movement spawned solidarity protests in numerous other cities during May 2011.

I. BACKGROUND
Since 2008, Spain, like numerous other European countries, experienced a significant financial and political crisis. An unemployment rate of 45% coupled with the collapse of the housing market left the Spanish economy in a frail state. For the Indignados, this was the result not only of anti-austerity measures, but also of a faulty two-party political party system. The 15M demonstrations were also the result of Spain’s free culture movement on Internet freedom. A number of activists and Internet lawyers had already mobilized to delay the passing of ‘Ley Sinde,’ an unpopular copyright bill that the Spanish government had drafted under American pressure according to Wikileaks. The protests were heavily influenced by popular protests in response to the banking crisis in Iceland, as well as by the Arab Spring.

The 15M manifestations were not spontaneous. Calls for mass demonstrations began online in March 2011. A group called Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now) was primarily responsible for organizing the protests under the slogan “We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers, Real democracy now!” The group was an umbrella platform for over 200 smaller civil society organizations. Still, the demonstrations caught the political elite by surprise. A non-violent manifestation, the number of protestors increased exponentially once demonstrators began to capture in real time police brutality against peaceful protestors on their mobile phone cameras, streaming this online and uploading images to Facebook and Twitter.

II. THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
The campaign had very broad goals: an end to the social consequences of anti-austerity measures, such as housing evictions, and the creation of a more representative, participatory, and deliberative political and financial system.

Structure
The 15M protests were purposefully highly decentralized but well organized. Each plaza had its own committees, which were in charge of day-to-day activities; working groups, which drafted proposals related to certain themes; and assemblies, which voted on the proposals. Additionally, consensus decision-making was utilized, as were rotating moderators and spokespeople to prevent the emergence of leaders. This was dictated by the ideological ethos of the movement, which aspired for greater participatory and deliberative democracy. By mid-June 2011, it became clear that occupying the squares indefinitely was not feasible and that the police would be dismantling the occupations; therefore, the movement made a strategic decision to decentralize even further, moving from the squares to the neighbourhoods.

\[\text{\footnotesize 40} \text{Postill, John. (2013) “Spain’s Indignados and the Mediated Aesthetics of Non-violence.” Melbourne: RMIT University.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 41} \text{Ibid.} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize 42} \text{Ibid.} \]
Tools and tactics

Digital Tools Used

- Facebook and Twitter: During the period of the May 2011 camps, the time spent on Twitter in Spain increased by 24%. The most popular hashtag was #acampadasol.

- N-1: an open source online platform that allowed users to upload agendas, email lists, and notifications about upcoming protests. It had 2,000 users pre-15M and 31,000 post-15M.

- Propongo: a website allowing assemblies to upload their agreed upon proposals so that other assemblies could register their support or get ideas for their own proposals.

- Tweetometro: a platform embedded through Twitter that allowed people to vote virtually on proposals being voted upon in the squares without being physically present.

- tomalaplaza.net: a website providing context, news, and first-person accounts on 15M.

- mobile phones: captured police violence, streamed the protests in real time online, and provided Internet access. During 2011, there was a 91.3% increase in the number of registered users of mobile Internet services via datacards and voice or data lines. Additionally, the majority of Tweets related to 15M came from mobile phones.

- oiga.me: a targeted online petitioning tool.

- sol.tv: an online live streaming website that generated nearly 10 million visits during the first week of the occupations.

Non-Digital Tools Used

- word of mouth: in one survey of 15M participants, it was cited as the primary first source of information regarding the initial demonstrations.

III. RESULTS

15M experienced greater success once it moved into the neighbourhoods and focused on smaller goals related to their broader goals. According to some, 15M was the precursor to the Occupy movement. Additionally, “indignation is becoming a generalized condition” in Spain.

---


45 Monterde, Arnau et al. Tecnopolitica, Internet y R-evoluciones sobre la realidad de redes digitales en el #15M. (2012) Barcelona: Icaria editorial


47 Ibid.


I. BACKGROUND
The campaign for universal suffrage in Hong Kong started long before late September 2014 when the images of yellow umbrellas and gridlocked streets filled the newsfeeds of media organizations the world over. Almost two years prior to this in January 2013, a law professor from the University of Hong Kong named Benny Tai Yiu-ting published an article in the Hong Kong Economic Journal (HKEJ) entitled The Most Destructive Weapon of Civil Disobedience, essentially establishing a pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and which called for a diverse participation. The decision to release his original editorial was spurred by the increasing signs that the electoral reform process for the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive election and the 2020 Legislative Council election would not meet the standards of universal suffrage as outlined in the Basic Law Article 45 of the Hong Kong Constitution. On August 31st, 2014, the Twelfth National People’s Congress, national legislature of the People’s Republic of China, set limits for the 2016 Legislative Council and 2017 Chief Executive elections in Hong Kong. The NPC claimed “universal suffrage” is still the goal; however, the decision imposes the standard that “the Chief Executive shall be a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong,” and requires that “the method for selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage must provide corresponding institutional safeguards for this purpose.” This did not satisfy the demands of OCLP, and along with the newly joined student organizations Scholarism and Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), they began the occupation and subsequent Umbrella Movement. The occupation officially lasted from 26 September 2014 to 15 December 2014, with the OCLP declaring their support on 28 September. All movement organizers have stated their willingness to continue their efforts for universal suffrage in Hong Kong, with next steps waiting until June or July of 2015 when the Chinese government releases their latest political reforms for Hong Kong.

II. THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
On March 27, 2013, all three OCLP leaders publically released their movements’ manifesto that defined their three goals and requirements of movement participates as: a) reform the electoral system of Hong Kong to satisfy international standards in relation to universal suffrage, b) that the electoral reform proposal should be decided by means of a democratic process, and c) that any act of civil disobedience, though illegal, must be “absolutely non-violent.”

Structure
Tai describes the OCLP deliberation process as the “incubator” of the idea and essential to establishing a decentralized movement that takes numerous stakeholder opinions into account. While Tai’s initial objective was to remain in the background of the movement, lack of leadership, volunteers, and positive support for himself from the wider network, meant that Tai and two others, Reverend Chu Yiu-ming and associated professor from the Chinese University of Hong Kong Chan Kin-man, agreed to lead the diverse movement. The organizational structure changed as the movement began its civil-disobedience phase and students, led by Alex Chow from HKFS and Joshua Wong from Scholarism, flooded into the streets. While initially the leadership structure was divided on this decision as OCLP thought the referendum turnout gave them a bargaining chip with the government, Tai later embraced the occupation and felt that all of their efforts in the years leading up to the Umbrella Movement laid a stable and peaceful foundational “spirit.” In early December, the three OCLP founders called for the end to the occupation and turned themselves into police a day after Joshua Wong advocated for students to regroup. This reveals how the organization’s structure was split on this specific action.

APPENDIX 1.07: OCCUPY CENTRAL WITH LOVE AND PEACE / UMBRELLA MOVEMENT

52 The Benny Tai, (Jan 16, 2013) “Gongmin Angming de Zuida Shashangli Wuqi” (The Most Destructive Weapon of Civil Disobedience), Hong Kong Economic Journal
Tools and tactics

Digital tools
- Tai utilized the OCLP Wordpress website as the initial platform with which to spread the campaign’s objectives in both Cantonese and English, and was significant for this movement as an accurate understanding of civil disobedience was essential to the campaign objectives.
- The polling site popvote.hk was the online platform used for the referendum that asked “the public to decide which of three proposals - all of which involve allowing citizens to directly nominate candidates - to present to the Beijing government.” This site was hit by a cyber attack in the middle of the referendum, forcing voters to vote in-person.
- WeChat, WhatsApp, and FireChat were all very popular messaging apps used by occupation participants, with WhatsApp identified as the main, and sometimes unreliable, form of communication between protestors.
- Translating the Umbrella Movement began translating into English for international journalists on-site during the protests and used Twitter, Facebook and Reddit to gain international attention.

Non-digital tools
- Sit-in demonstrations were staged in major Hong Kong traffic points including Mong Kok and Causeway Bay
- Students boycotted classes to express their support for the campaign

III. RESULTS
True universal suffrage for electing the political leaders of Hong Kong was not achieved throughout the three year long campaign of OCLP and the occupation and protests of the Umbrella Movement. Beijing did make some concessions from their proposed political process and when Tai was interviewed in mid-March 2015, he stated that he believes his actions have created a greater chance of democratic reform in Hong Kong and remains optimistic. The student leaders Joshua Wong and Alex Chow have also stated their desire to continue with pro-democracy and continue to speak at events around the world advocating for universal suffrage in Hong Kong.

55 Mozer, Paul. (June 22, 2014)”Hong Kong Democracy Poll Hit by Cyberattack.” WSJ. Dow Jones & Company, Inc
The People’s Climate March (PCM) was a large-scale event to advocate for global action against climate change. Held just two days before the United Nations Climate Summit, the march galvanized 400,000 to the streets of New York.\textsuperscript{56} Using various social media platforms to mobilize individuals and demonstrate solidarity, the march in New York became the largest climate march in history. Nevertheless, the PCM was not confined to New York, and involved events all over the world.

I. BACKGROUND

A number of activists, academics, non-profit organizations, and politicians have dedicated their lives to advocating for climate action. Bill McKibben, a vocal climate change activist and founder of 350.org, called individuals into action through an article in Rolling Stone magazine on June 5, 2014 offering an “invitation to anyone who’d like to prove to themselves, and to their children, that they give a damn about the biggest crisis our civilization has ever faced”.\textsuperscript{57} In a demonstration of solidarity and the global demand for action, there were subsequently 2,646 events around the world. These events ranged from more than 2,500 people across India taking to the street in New Delhi to demonstrations across Africa including in Togo, Niger, and The Ivory Coast.\textsuperscript{58}

II. THE CAMPAIGN

Goals

The PCM in New York City had one overarching goal; to have the largest march for climate justice in history. With 310,000 people on the streets of New York City, including 1,574 different organizations, the PCM has been credited as the largest climate march in history.\textsuperscript{59} Some have noted the importance of this march in the struggle for climate justice as the march presents an “omnipresent counterpoint” to inaction as 400,000 people have demonstrated their commitment to addressing climate change.\textsuperscript{60} While the march had these broad goals and themes, the PCM did not have specifically defined goals. Stuart Basden, President of 350.org Toronto notes that the march was a demonstration of the widespread commitment to climate justice and that “this helped get people out as no one had to fight for the speakerphone”.\textsuperscript{61}

Structure

The PCM was inherently decentralized with the involvement of 1,574 organizations participating in the march in New York, in addition to the 2,646 international events. These organizations were heavily involved in the planning of the march as well as coordinating central events. For example, Basden notes that he was involved in conference calls with 60 to 80 individuals in the weeks prior to the march.\textsuperscript{62} Nevertheless, 350.org took much of the responsibility for planning and logistics in addition to mobilizing individuals.

\textsuperscript{56} People’s Climate March, “Wrap Up”. Retrieved from http://peoplesclimate.org/wrap-up/  
\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Stuart Basden. President of 350.org Toronto (February 26, 2015).  
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
Tools and tactics

Digital Tools Used

- Email Blasts and petitions: messages were targeted with information bolded.
- Centralized website: PeoplesClimate.org had all information available, including logistics.
- Social media platforms: The hashtag #PeoplesClimate generated 956.33 million social impressions.\(^{63}\)
- Thunderclap: a tool used to amplify a message on twitter where 1,889 individuals ‘donated’ a tweet to the PCM.\(^{64}\)
- Tint: a social media aggregator to pulled posts from Twitter onto the central website.\(^{65}\)
- Broadcasting: PCM had various screens during the march projecting events around the world.\(^{66}\)

Non-Digital Tools Used

- Orientation events: 350.org Toronto went to over fifteen Frosh Events throughout the Greater Toronto Area to mobilize students.\(^{67}\)
- Posters and canvassers: these often appealed to individual emotion.
- Emphasis on logistics: utilizing digital tools such as the central website, organizers disseminated information about where to go, how to get there from out of town, and where to put your bicycle.\(^{68}\)
- Marshals: individuals trained before the march to help facilitate organization and logistics.\(^{69}\)

III. RESULTS

As the largest ever march demanding climate action, the PCM demonstrated solidarity in ending climate change. This solidarity generated significant attention, as it was featured in a number of traditional media organizations such as TIME and The New York Times. Moreover, President Barack Obama recognized the impact of the PCM during his remarks at the UN Climate Change Summit on September 23, 2014, noting, “our citizens keep marching. We cannot pretend we do not hear them. We have to answer the call”.\(^{70}\) Nevertheless, the PCM did not influence any direct policy change.

---


\(^{66}\) Interview with Elana Brown, Executive Assistant at Avaaz (February 27, 2015).

\(^{67}\) Interview with Stuart Basden. President of 350.org Toronto (February 26, 2015).


\(^{69}\) Interview with Elana Brown, Executive Assistant at Avaaz (February 27, 2015).

The anti-SOPA/PIPA campaign was a series of coordinated online and offline protests in regards to two proposed pieces of copyright legislation in the USA. These protests ran from late 2011 to early 2012, and were predominantly staged on the Internet. By the end of January 2012, both the SOPA and PIPA proposed bills were removed from the legislative process.

I. BACKGROUND

The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) were two pieces of copyright related legislation proposed before the United Senate Senate and United States House of Representatives in late 2011. Their intended purpose was to create a legal framework for blocking copyright infringing content in the USA on websites that are based outside of the USA.

The introduction of these two bills immediately sparked a significant amount of opposition. This opposition stemmed from a wide variety of sources including technology companies and concerned citizens. The focus of the opposition was the vague, open-ended nature of the SOPA/PIPA legislation, and the potential it would have to restrict access to entirely legitimate information and content on the Internet.

The SOPA/PIPA protests were also unique in the way that their support developed almost exclusively through a grassroots process hosted on the Internet. Internet forums, chatrooms and other venues of communication, served as the incubator for the campaign, and also informed the general direction of the campaign.

II. THE CAMPAIGN

Goals

The clear goal of the SOPA/PIPA protests was to stop the proposed SOPA/PIPA legislation from becoming law.

Structure

While SOPA/PIPA developed organically as a grassroots campaign, certain civil society organizations played a key role in organizing and coordinating the protests. Chief among these groups was the organization Fight for the Future, which served as a central point of coordination for distributed action and support.

Offline protests were staged largely as localized, decentralized events, although the offline protest leaders communicated in advance.\(^7\)

\(^7\) Interview with Jonathan Nelson, Founder at Hackers/Founders (March 5, 2015).
Tactics and tools
Digital tools
Many websites that supported the SOPA/PIPA protests blacked out their entire sites or home pages on January 18, 2012. These sites would redirect visitors to informational pages regarding the negative aspects of SOPA/PIPA, and show visitors how they could support the protests.

- Fight for the Future set up online forums, organized by political districts, to allow constituents to identify and contact their political representatives. This also allowed those in the same constituencies to coordinate their action and work together.72
- OpenCongress.org, a website which supported the protests, also served as a informational platform to connect constituents to their political representatives.
- Click-to-call technology, whereby protest supporters could call the constituency offices of their political representatives simply by clicking a button on a website.73
- Protest supporters on the website Reddit coordinated a ‘Google Bomb’ attack on the website GoDaddy.com, which opposed the protests. This attack involved modifying the terms GoDaddy was associated with when it was searched on Google.74
- Organizers also made videos hosted on YouTube to explain the SOPA/PIPA legislation to a mass audience.75

Non-digital tools
- Campaign supporters also met with their political representatives to voice their concerns regarding the legislation.

III. RESULTS
On January 18, 2012, the main sponsors of the PIPA legislation in the Senate withdrew their support for the bill. Subsequently, many congressmen withdrew their support or issued statements criticizing the proposed versions of each bill. By January 20, both bills were withdrawn from the legislative process.

72 Interview with Holmes Wilson, Co-Founder of Fight for the Future (February 26, 2015)
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
APPENDIX 1.10: TURKISH INTERNET UNGOVERNANCE FORUM

Held in September 2014 to protest the Turkish government’s hosting of the 2014 United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the Internet Ungovernance Forum (IUF) was a successful ‘counter-meeting’ organized by the broader Turkish Internet freedom campaign. Hosting expert panels, informative workshops, and policy discussions, the IUF marked an important precedent in global Internet governance.

I. BACKGROUND
What began as a small sit-in to protest the removal of Gezi Park in Istanbul’s Taksim Square turned into a massive collection of protests spanning Turkey, after initial participants were violently evicted by state authorities. Taking place in the summer of 2013, the protests drew an estimated 3.5 million participants. The causes of citizen mobilization evolved quickly to vocalize a wide array of grievances, including the state of democracy, media, and Internet censorship in Turkey. Twitter, widely used for expressing dissent and mobilizing Turkish protests, was eventually banned within Turkey after being labelled a ‘nuisance’ by the government.76

The banning of Twitter, and subsequently YouTube, was a watershed moment for Turkish pro-Internet freedom activists, who had been organizing Internet marches since before 2011.77 As the Turkish government was set to host the 2014 IGF meeting in Istanbul, many Turkish activists chose to boycott the event and instead organized their own ‘counter-summit’ – the IUF. The event garnered international support from global civil society organizations, holding two days of programming in parallel to the IGF.

II. THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
The larger Internet freedom campaign includes a wide array of protestors and grievances, and as a result, does not have defined goals. Rather, the movement binds a number of civil society organizations and activists under the shared banner of improving democracy in Turkey.

The sub-campaign of Turkish Internet freedom had slightly more defined goals: ending media censorship and disinformation, and Internet censorship by government authorities.78 The Internet Ungovernance Forum utilized these goals to garner support, while organizers aimed to create a counter-space to discuss more sensitive Internet policy decisions, parallel to the IGF.79

During the event, the forum’s goals were to “talk about the real problems of the Internet,” focusing attention on broadcasting grievances to global audiences and advocacy against the Turkish government’s actions, while providing activists with information and tools to improve digital security.

Structure
The IUF was a coordinated campaign by Turkish civil society organizations and activists: Alternative Informatics Association, Istanbul Hackerspace, Bilgi University, Yaman Akdeniz, and Kerem Altiparmak (who publicly boycotted the IGF event). These organizations were all operating within the Internet freedom space, and coordinated effectively together for the event. So, while the organizational committee of the IUF was centralized for the event, it was a distributed network of civil society actors working together effectively. The IUF also benefited greatly from coalition networking, both from the broader pro-democracy movement in Turkey, and the global network of pro-Internet freedom organizations. Support in the way of funding and organizational capacity came from a collection of civil society organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, and Association for Progressive Communication.80

---

77 Interview with Sedat Kapanoglu, Owner – Sour Dictionary (March 19, 2015)
78 Interview with Nate Schenkkan, Program Officer – Freedom House (Feb 19, 2015)
Tools and tactics

Digital tools
- Central event website; social media platforms for marketing (#ungovforum) and logistics;
- Event workshops taught digital risk mitigation tools, like Psi-phon and Bitmask;
- High reliance on digital outlets for citizen journalism, like P24 (Platform for Independent Journalism), VagusTV, and 140journos.

Non-digital tools
- Mass public protests, as part of the larger Internet freedom campaign;
- IUF – multi-day policy discussion conference with expert speakers (including Julian Assange and Edward Snowden);
- Hosted informational booth at the IGF village for distribution of materials;
- Organized effective event logistics, including convenient shuttle service between IGF and IUF.

III. RESULTS

Despite the unblocking of Twitter and YouTube, the state of Internet freedom in Turkey is still not optimal. A recent bill passed by Turkish parliament giving government ministers the authority to remove web material “deemed a threat to national security, or liable to cause public disorder,” as well as a new report detailing the government’s increased crackdowns on independent journalism, illustrate the poor Internet environment. The IUF succeeded in garnering widespread global support against Turkey’s regressive Internet policies, particularly due to its strategy of working in parallel to the IGF. The IGF’s Twitter analytics is evidence of this, as #ungovforum was overwhelmingly the most popular secondary hashtag to the United Nations’ #igf2014 tag (see below). Therefore, the IUF succeeded in short term goals, but the broader Turkish Internet freedom campaign was not as successful in leveraging that support for domestic political reform. The degree of openness within the Turkish political system is a key area of analysis for determining whether this campaign can affect positive change within Turkey.

We Are All Khaled Said is the name of a Facebook page that gained widespread attention due to the critical role it played in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Initially, the Facebook page spread the story of Khaled Said’s murder and provided a platform for awareness of police brutality. During the protests, the page helped to coordinate efforts, while Twitter was widely used for on-the-ground updates. After the initial protests and with the removal of Mubarak from office, the Facebook page was a platform for political dialogue and showcased divisions between internal members of the page. Administrators announced a freeze on the site in July 2013 after Morsi left office.

I. BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2010, Khaled Said, a young, middle-class Egyptian man, was at an internet café when members of the Egyptian police force arrested him and beat him to death on the street outside. There were numerous witnesses to the horrific event that day, but the event gained greater notice when a photo taken of Khaled’s deformed, beaten face was posted on the internet that challenged the police’s claim that he had died by choking on a bag of drugs he was attempting to hide. Wael Ghonim, a social entrepreneur and marketing executive from Google, was one of the many Egyptians who were deeply affected by this image. In response, he and a political activist and journalist named Abdul Rahman Mansour created the Arabic language Facebook group called “We Are All Khaled Said” (this is the translated name, although an English language Facebook page was also created). The page quickly gained lots of visitors and was instrumental in the protests on January 25, 2011, and the ‘Day of Rage’ which occurred 3 days later.

II. THE CAMPAIGN
Goals
The page itself relied heavily on the participatory nature that Facebook allowed for in terms of featuring polls, user comments, and taking ideas from users that communicated via private messages; therefore, as the name of the group implies, the agenda was set by the people on the page. One site states “Our main and only goal is to end torture in Egypt. We do not have any hidden political agenda nor do we get any support from any organisation... We also want to show the world that Egyptians are standing up for their rights. Brave Egyptian men and women along with their brave international supporters will no longer stay quiet about torture in Egypt and Police [sic] brutality and we will expose everyone who commits or condones torture.”

However, after the toppling of former President Hosni Mubarak, the page became more political and showed “the fragmentation of Egyptian society and members of the page... it was enriching to have these discussions but there was a significant breaking of rank within the integrity of the page and the continuity and with the vision of what needed to happen.”

86 Interview with Adel Iskandar, Ph. D., Associate Professor at Simon Frasier University, Department of Communications (March 10, 2015)
Tactics and tools

Digital tools
- Facebook page: the Facebook page gained millions of followers and allowed a place for decisions to be made, events to be organized, footage to be featured, and a forum to dialogue.
- Sharing Photos and Videos: especially through the use of cell phone cameras, sharing media was instrumental in documenting the protests and sharing them widely.
- Twitter coordination: enabled on-the-move coordination and communication during protests.87
- Connecting with Media: the administrators and others connected with media sources to spread the messages beyond a single Facebook page or Tahrir Square, there were press releases, media lists, and live updates.
- Bloggers: “blogs helped in “paving the way for the 2011 revolution by raising public awareness...as well as encouraging effective action and organization during the revolution itself... also served as forums for “online deliberation” and “electronic debate.””88
- SMS Messaging: helped with coordination, especially during the Internet blackout.
- Google/Twitter’s ‘Speak-to-Tweet’- allows a person to verbally create a tweet, which was able to appear online throughout the Internet blackout.89

Non-digital tools
- Silent Stand/Protests: Facebook page helped coordinate a move that challenged the Emergency Law which prohibited more than five people from gathering; participants would dress in black and stand quietly five feet apart while facing the water.
- Protests (Jan. 25, 2011, ‘Day of Rage,’ etc.): people went to the streets in a great display of solidarity.
- Political Cartoons: helped to ease tensions and raise awareness.

“The website was used for offline and online mobilization simultaneously. In fact, we can safely argue that these two forms of mobilization were mutually reinforcing and strengthening each other through a cyclical, interrelated and ongoing process.”90

III. RESULTS

The We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page has received much credit for its role throughout the Egyptian Revolution. So much so, that it has repeatedly been called “The Facebook Revolution.” It was this page that first suggested actions on January 25, 2011, which turned out to be a critical turning point in the revolution and in Mubarak’s resignation. The most well-known Facebook page administrator, Wael Ghonim, was arrested and held for 11 days, but he quotes the unity that the page helped to bring to the Egyptian people as one positive result.91 Many, however, believe that the page did not create the intended change, an end to police brutality or political corruption.

---

87 I Interview with Adel Iskandar, Ph.D., Associate Professor at Simon Fraser University, Department of Communications (March 10, 2015)
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
1. What prompted you to launch (specific campaign)? Whose idea was it?

2. What were the goals of your campaign? Were they static or did they evolve over time?

3. How intentionally did you structure leadership? What changes did you make to it over the course of the campaign?

4. What kind of imagery or language did you use to activate members of your campaign? (Logos, posters or rallying cries)

5. What digital tools did you use? Why? Were they effective?

6. What was the specific message you first sent out to your members to galvanize them into action? Did this message evolve over time?

7. Did your campaign involve direct action outside of lobbying for governmental change? Were these tactics legal/illegal?

8. What metrics did you use to measure success?

9. Why, in your opinion, was your campaign successful or not?

10. In what language was your campaign conducted? Multi-lingual?

11. Did you make a conscious effort to attempt to use any tools that would protect your anonymity or to combat censorship on digital mediums? Which ones?

12. What are the biggest challenges and risks to this kind of project?

13. Do you have any tips for individuals hoping to organize a similar campaign?

14. Who else should we speak to?

15. Would you want to want to record some of these questions for public release?
APPENDIX 3:

We Are All Khaled Said (2010)

Dr. Adel Iskandar (Associate Professor at Simon Fraser University, Department of Communications) on Skype interview on 10 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

Ahmed Kadry (Academic and author specializing in Middle Eastern Affairs) Skype interview on 20 February, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

Nadine Wahab (Human Rights Defender and former administrator of We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page) Skype interview on 20 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

Dr. Sahar Khamis (Associate Professor at the University of Maryland; author of Islam Dot Com and Egyptian Revolution 2.0) Phone interview on 10 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

I Paid a Bribe (2010)

Venkatesh Kannaiah (Head of Content for Janaonline) Skype interview on 28 February 2015 by Nick Dagostino.

Sylvia Veeraraghavan (Coordinator for Janaonline) Skype interview on 8 March 2015 by Nick Dagostino.

Ben Elers. (Programmes Director at Transparency International) Skype interview on 20 February 2015 by Nick Dagostino.

SOPA/PIPA (2011)

Jonathan Nelson (Co-Founder of Hackers and Founders) Skype interview on 5 March 2015 by Theo Milosevic.

Holmes Wilson (Co-Founder of Fight for the Future) Skype interview on 22 February 2015 by Theo Milosevic.

Avaaz's Break the Blackout (2011)

Emma Ruby-Sachs (Campaign Director at Avaaz) Skype interview on 6 February 2015 by Viktoria Lovrics.

Unattributable (Expert Familiar with Information Controls and Syrian Conflict) Skype interview on 6 March 2015 by Viktoria Lovrics.

Will Davies (Media Campaigner at Avaaz) Skype interview on 12 March 2015 by Amanda Coletta.

15M/Indignados (2011)

Unattributable (Research fellow present in Barcelona during the initial marches) interview on 06 February 2015 by Amanda Coletta

Unattributable (Member of Communications committee at 15M Barcelona) interview on 02 March 2015 by Amanda Coletta

Unattributable (Anonymous 15M participant in Madrid) interview on 15 February 2015 by Amanda Coletta

Unattributable (Anonymous 15M participant in Madrid) interview on 26 March 2015 by Amanda Coletta

Unattributable (15M data analyst) interview on 17 February 2015 by Amanda Coletta

Idle No More (2012)

Clayton Thomas-Muller (Organizer at Defenders of the Land and former organizer for Idle No More) Skype interview on 26 February 2015 by Theo Milosevic.

Mark Blevis (President of Full Duplex Digital Public Affairs) Skype interview on 20 February 2015 by Theo Milosevic.

Tori Ann Cress (Social Media and Fundraising organizer for Idle No More) Skype interview on 25 February 2015 by Theo Milosevic.

Chinese Labour Standards (2012)

Kevin Slatten (Program Coordinator with China Labor Watch) Skype interview on 5 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick
**Chinese Labour Standards (2012)**

Kevin Slaten (Program Coordinator with China Labor Watch)  
Skype interview on 5 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

Mark Shields (Creator of a Change.org petition about labor issues in factories that Apple uses)  
Phone interview on 5 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

Sarah Ryan (Campaign Strategist and Coordinator with Change.org)  
Skype interview on 6 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

Shreema Mehta (International Program Coordinator for EarthWorks which ran a petition on Change.org for their No Dirty Gold campaign)  
Skype interview on 9 March, 2015 by Samantha Rudick

**Occupy Central with Love and Peace/ The Umbrella Movement (2013)**

Arthur Lo Man Ki (Founder and digital manager of Translating the Umbrella Movement)  
Skype interview on 14 March 2015 by Samuel Wollenberg.

Benny Tai Yiu-ting (Associate Professor of Law at the University of Hong Kong; Founding member of Occupy Central with Love and Peace)  
Skype interview on 11 March, 2015 by Samuel Wollenberg.

Unattributable (Journalist; Hong Kong).  
Skype interview on 7 February, 2015 by Samuel Wollenberg.


Ali Bangi (Director at ASL 19)  
In-person interview on 19 February, 2015 by Samuel Wollenberg.

Karl Kathuria (CEO at Psiphon Inc)  
In-person interview on 11 March, 2015 by Samuel Wollenberg.

Sean Willet (Chief of Communications, Munk School of Global Affairs)  
In-person interview on 11 March, 2015 by Samuel Wollenberg.

**Peoples Climate March (2013)**

Elana Brown (Executive Assistant at Avaaz)  
Skype interview on 27 February 2015 by Viktoria Lovrics

Stuart Basden (President of 350.org Toronto)  
Skype interview on 26 February 2015 by Viktoria Lovrics

Dana R. Fisher (Sociologist at University of Maryland)  
Phone interview on 4 March 2015 by Viktoria Lovrics

Muriel Macdonald (Employee at Tint and blogger)  
Skype interview on 6 March 2015 by Viktoria Lovrics

**The Internet Ungovernance Forum (2014)**

Nate Schenkkan (Program Officer for Eurasia at Freedom House)  
Skype interview on 13 March 2015 by Nick Dagostino

Sedat Kapanoglu (Owner of “The Sour Dictionary” and human rights activist)  
Correspondence on 6 March 2015 by Nick Dagostino.
List of Acronyms

APPENDIX 4:

Movimiento 15 (15M)

We Are All Khaled Said (WAKS)

I Paid a Bribe (IPAB)

Idle No More (INM)

Occupy Central with Love and Peace/ The Umbrella Movement (OCLP)

The Global Dialogue on the Future of Iran (GDFI)

Peoples Climate March (PCM)

The Internet Ungovernance Forum (IUF)


Iskander, Adel. Interview with Samantha Rudick. Skype interview. Toronto, March 10, 2015.


MacDonald, Muriel. Interview with Viktoria Lovrics. Skype interview. Toronto, March 6, 2015.


Ryan, Sarah. Interview with Samantha Rudick. Skype interview. Toronto, March 6, 2015.


Syrian information controls expert. Interview with Viktoria Lovrica. Personal interview. March 6, 2015.


